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ABSTRACT 
 
 Mobile device data continues to increase in significance in both civil and criminal 
investigations. Location data is often of particular interest. To date, research has established that 
the devices are location aware, incorporate a variety of resources to obtain location information, 
and cache the information in various ways. However, a review of the existing research suggests 
varying degrees of reliability of any such recovered location data. In an effort to clarify the issue, 
this project offers case studies of multiple Android mobile devices utilized in controlled 
conditions with known settings and applications in documented locations. The study uses data 
recovered from test devices to corroborate previously identified accuracy trends noted in 
research involving live-tracked devices, and it further offers detailed analysis strategies for the 
recovery of location data from devices themselves. A methodology for reviewing device data for 
possible artifacts that may allow an examiner to evaluate location data reliability is also 
presented. This paper also addresses emerging trends in device security and cloud storage, which 
may have significant implications for future mobile device location data recovery and analysis. 
Discussion of recovered cloud data introduces a distinct and potentially significant resource for 
investigators, and the paper addresses the cloud resources’ advantages and limitations. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 Mobile devices have become pervasive throughout modern society and everyday life. As 
the devices have increased in proliferation, they have likewise improved in capabilities. They 
essentially function as pocket-sized computers, with full operating systems and the ability to 
install and run additional applications. Their hardware features have expanded to move beyond 
the transmission of voice and text content to include multimedia, internet browsing and 
streaming, location awareness, and navigation functionalities. This enrichment of features and 
capabilities has further entrenched the mobile device into everyday life for many, whether it be 
checking email or searching for a restaurant nearby.  
 Leaving aside the sociological implications of this heightened connectivity and 
convenience phenomenon, the frequency and intimate nature of use by the mobile device owner 
make them rich sources of data about an individual’s interests, activity, relationships, and 
communication. Naturally, this makes the mobile device a particularly valuable source of 
evidence in both criminal and civil investigations. Because users interact so often and so 
personally with their devices, their content may be of interest even in less obvious cases, where 
the incident does not directly involve the use of the device but the device may still hold 
information that could inform the investigation or adjudication of the case. 
 In particular, the location-awareness of mobile devices means they could store or 
generate historical location data that may document the device’s, and by extension, the user’s, 
whereabouts during a particular timeframe of interest in the case. Such data, if recovered and 
identified, could corroborate the accounts of witnesses in the case or implicate a suspect or even 
assist in the recovery of a missing person. Of course, much depends on the reliability of any such 
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cached location information, as well as an examiner’s ability to recover and interpret it from a 
particular device. 
 This paper will elaborate on the investigative role of mobile device location data and 
review existing research pertaining to the capabilities and data recovery efforts specifically 
involving Android devices and location information. The study focuses on criminal 
investigations in particular, but the concepts and methodologies presented would apply in civil 
contexts, as well. It further aims to address the complex nature of such recovery and 
interpretation by utilizing test devices in controlled conditions and examining the data extracted 
from the devices for evaluation of accuracy via comparison with the documented location 
history. It also examines the emerging role of cloud resources and presents test device cloud data 
retrieved for this study. Informed by the test findings, a general strategy for analysis of Android 
devices for location data will be presented, as will a discussion of limitations and 
recommendations for future research.   
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 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
   
 
Proliferation and Utilization of Mobile Devices 
 According to the Pew Research Center (2014), a majority of American adults (58%) own 
a smartphone, and 29% of them identify their device as a necessity which they cannot imagine 
doing without. A separate report focusing on Internet users found that 80% of online adults 
possess a smartphone, spending an average of 1.85 hours per day online via their mobile device. 
Android-based devices comprise the largest market share at 54% (Mander, 2014), while also 
boasting high growth rates in emerging markets and a large app base of over 200,000 
downloadable, third-party apps (Maus, Hofken, & Schuba, 2011). Android is an open-source 
mobile device operating system developed and maintained by Google. 
 Empirically, it is clear that smartphones have become an entrenched and intimate part of 
daily life in the modern world. Pew (2014) reports that 44% of cell phone owners have slept with 
their phone next to their bed. Just over a third of U.S. households utilize a cell phone in lieu of a 
landline, and individuals carry their phones with them everywhere and use them in a myriad of 
ways. As a society, we have come to rely on these devices not just for communication, but also 
to get directions, coordinate schedules, and even make purchases (Wells, 2014). Smartphones 
have clearly evolved into more complex and powerful tools. Such developments prompted the 
Washington State Senate Judiciary Committee to ask in 2012, “Have [mobile devices] also 
effectively become tracking devices (State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012)?”  
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 Certainly, there are those who would see the advantages of this, at least in some 
circumstances. Senator Charles Schumer has called for the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to implement improvement plans for emergency call tracking of cell phones, 
noting that 70% of 911 calls now come from a cell phone (Fox, 2015). He recounted an incident 
from his state of New York, in which an elderly woman called 911 from a cell phone after 
having a stroke. Because her speech was slurred due to the stroke, she was unable to provide her 
address to the dispatcher. An address was obtained based on which cell tower(s) she was 
connected to during the call. The address proved inaccurate, however, and it was 8 hours before 
responders managed to find her. She died the next day (Schumer, 2015).  
 The big U.S. carriers (Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile) pledged their commitment 
to a goal of providing precise location data to 911 dispatchers for 40% of cell phone 911 calls 
within two years, and 80% within six years. The FCC suggests this specific location information 
should be accurate within 50 meters horizontally and 3 meters vertically. The proposed method 
for achieving this level of accuracy involves the incorporation of nearby, static Bluetooth and 
WLAN-enabled devices, such as smoke detectors or wireless routers, which will be logged with 
a precise location in a special emergency services database. Carriers also plan to ensure that 
handset WLAN and Bluetooth functionality can be enabled remotely in an emergency, if they are 
disabled (Selyukh, 2014). 
 Other aims involving smartphones as tracking devices are less consequential, perhaps, 
but may be just as sensitive. Marketing companies, such as Path Intelligence (PI), claim to be 
able to detect phones entering their client’s business, recording the frequency and duration of 
their visits, as well as the typical routes they take from business to business. PI markets this 
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technology to shopping malls. However, this obviously involves the collection of shoppers’ 
location information, likely without their knowledge or consent, and then using that data for 
profit (Michael, 2013).  
 On the more altruistic end of the spectrum, some researchers have focused on the 
potential use of smartphones as a low-cost tracking device for Alzheimer patients. The devices 
often combine GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) functionality with internet access, so 
providers or caregivers could use a web-based application to monitor current or past location 
information for the patients (Paiva & Abreu, 2012). So the concept of using smartphones to 
monitor users’ locations has been embraced from multiple perspectives. 
 Even smartphone users themselves often use their devices as tracking devices, as a 
convenience. A study published in 2010 of almost 50,000 Android apps showed that 40% of the 
apps utilize the device location (Maus et al., 2011). Apps like Gas Buddy, Yelp, Waze, and Back 
Country Navigator allow users to find products or services nearby, navigate to them, and even 
use their devices as GPS guides in remote places (Reisinger, 2013). Pew (2014) reported that 
74% of smartphone owners had used their device to get directions, recommendations, or some 
other location-based information, with 12% saying they had used their device to “check in” at a 
particular location or to share their whereabouts with friends/family. Some apps market this 
location sharing feature as a public safety measure, allowing parents to monitor their children’s 
locations. 
 As another interested party on public safety matters, law enforcement also explores the 
use of mobile devices for tracking purposes. Given the intimate nature of the devices and the fact 
that over 6 billion cell phone subscriptions exist in the world (Wells, 2014), law enforcement 
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interest in such functionality is unsurprising. In discussing the usage of cell phones as tracking 
devices by law enforcement, Wells also noted that cell phone carriers informed Congress that 
they collectively received 1.3 million requests for customer information in 2011. This involved 
both real-time tracking and historical information on cell site connections obtained from the 
carrier. Both of these practices will be explored in greater detail later in the paper, in terms of 
how they are implemented as well as existing research on their reliability. 
 These descriptions of smartphone roles in law enforcement, emergency response, 
marketing, user convenience, and even healthcare emphasize their ubiquity and the depth to 
which they have permeated modern life. Their internet connectivity and location awareness have 
been powerful contributors to these developments. The next section explores the technological 
features that enable these functions. 
 
Device Capabilities and Location Awareness 
Indeed, mobile devices come equipped with a substantial arsenal of hardware sensors and 
transmitters to facilitate location awareness, augmented by web-based services operated by 
various private and public entities. This section of the paper will examine these resources and 
their role in sustaining location-based services in Android devices. 
The State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee (2012) identified four key ways 
mobile devices may determine a user’s location: GNSS, cellular network information, WLAN 
access points, and users themselves. A review of the first three of these resources will 
demonstrate their relative strengths and weaknesses, followed by a discussion of the services that 
supplement the hardware-based abilities of the device. 
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 Before evaluating the utility of GNSS, more detail on its components and operation is 
warranted. GNSS is a relatively newer term used to encompass all potential satellite systems a 
device may use, since the activation of the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GLONASS) toppled the exclusivity previously held by the U.S.-operated Global Positioning 
System (GPS). Other satellite systems operated by other entities or nations are emerging, but 
thus far, these are the two commonly used in U.S. devices (Last, 2015). Throughout this paper, 
when the term “GNSS” is used, it refers to GPS and GLONASS. Where a cited study strictly 
refers only to “GPS,” the term GPS will be used. 
The GPS network includes 27 operational satellites and has been operating for over 30 
years (State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012). Alternatively, GLONASS 
utilizes 23 operational satellites as of January 2012 (Cai, 2013). Both operate in similar fashion, 
via trilateration. The device receives signals from as many satellites as it can, then measures the 
distance between each satellite based on the time each satellite’s signal takes to travel to the 
device, in order to determine its precise location. Devices do not actively transmit their location 
(Last, 2015). Since both systems require line-of-sight paths between at least three satellites and 
the terrestrial devices utilizing them, they are subject to some limitations. Specifically, it can take 
a significant amount of time to get signals from enough satellites, and signals may be degraded 
or blocked entirely if there are atmospheric interferences or solar activity, topographical 
obstructions, or if the device is being used indoors or underground (Michael, 2013). In short, the 
big factor in the accuracy or utility of GNSS services is the surroundings (Last, 2015). 
Additional constraints are more fundamental: sensors are not present in all cell phones (though 
certainly in most if not all smartphones); the process requires a lot of power, draining the device 
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battery quickly; due to the power concerns, the sensor(s) are not typically enabled by default and 
must be activated by the user. On the plus side, when GNSS services are used successfully, the 
data is typically extremely accurate and often includes additional detail on speed, altitude, and 
direction of travel, or bearing (Lifchitz, 2010). 
Cellular network strategies typically present the opposite traits. All cellular phones 
possess the necessary transceiver, so additional hardware is not required. Furthermore, the 
function is typically enabled by default and consumes significantly less battery power, provided 
cellular network coverage is adequate. Cellular coverage continues to expand and improve in the 
United States, with over 280,000 cell sites in use as of June 2012. The tradeoff usually involves 
accuracy. In rural areas, where cell site towers are sometimes miles apart, accuracy tends to be 
less than in urban areas, which have higher tower densities (Wells, 2014). Other factors affecting 
the reliability of cellular network location data will be detailed later in the paper. 
Since every cell tower is uniquely identified and carriers maintain location information 
on each of their towers, the towers with which a phone communicates provide the basis for 
tracking its location. When a phone is on and the cellular service is enabled, the phone will 
attempt to connect to a tower as often as every 7 seconds (State of Washington Senate Judiciary 
Committee, 2012). Phones will often communicate with multiple towers simultaneously or 
within very short amounts of time. In these instances, a more precise location for the device may 
be obtained via triangulation. This process may be activated and tracked remotely from the 
network side, unlike GNSS, in a process known as “pinging” (Lifchitz, 2010). So in an 
emergency, for example, responders can utilize carrier resources to activate the device’s E911 
system, which will then use the cellular network pinging process or even activate the phone’s 
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GNSS service. The device can then obtain precise GNSS coordinates, if available, and then 
transmit them to emergency services via the carrier’s network to help guide responders to the 
right place (Daniel, 2014).  
The last of the hardware-based tools involves WLAN networks. This is actually a sort of 
hybrid approach, because it involves the use of network-based geolocation services. The 
technique involves the detection of nearby WLAN access points, along with their relative signal 
strengths (Brouwers & Woehrle, 2012), followed by a query of a remotely stored database 
containing location information associated with the particular access point’s media access 
control (MAC) address (State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012). Theoretically, 
it could circumvent this remote query process if the MAC address-location information were 
stored locally on the device, as some third-party apps billed as “WLAN hotspot finders” purport 
to do. In either case, the benefits of the WLAN method typically involve lower power 
consumption, no performance detriment indoors, and decent accuracy. However, WLAN 
connectivity must also be enabled by the user, relies on the presence of access points (or other 
nearby hardware tracked in the queried database, such as cell towers, Bluetooth devices like 
smoke detectors, etc. [24]), and may not be as accurate as GNSS location results (Lifchitz, 2010). 
The discussion of WLAN-based methods introduced the extended functionality offered 
by remotely operated services. A key provider of the aforementioned remote location lookup 
services is Google itself, which maintains a database supported by the “anonymous” collection of 
geographic data for cell tower or WLAN routers to which its users are connected. By opting to 
use Google’s Location Services, users agree to contribute to this database (4RENSIKER, 2012). 
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The Google location database is thus vast and constantly updated, receiving data from Google’s 
cars (street view and automated) and of course, Android phones (Lifchitz, 2010). 
Android devices have built-in application programming interfaces (APIs) for location 
services developed and maintained by Google. Both stock Android apps and third-party apps use 
these services (Davydov, 2011). The location API may use any of the previously described 
resources to obtain device location, depending on the availability of the resource, as well as the 
parameters of the particular app. Apps may be programmed to request the current device 
location, receive updates on the location, look up addresses from detected device latitude and 
longitude (this process is known as reverse geocoding), or perform geofencing or activity 
recognition (“Making your app,” 2015). Geofencing involves the caching of location history of 
the device or recognition of a particular location, in order to provide additional context-based 
functionality, such as reminding a user of some task when they arrive home (Maus et al., 2011).  
Google’s application development tutorials offer some insight into the functionality of 
their own location services API, the fused location provider. Specifically, app developers must 
not only code for the location functions described above, but they must also ensure their app 
contains the appropriate permissions to do so. Location permissions come in two flavors: coarse 
and fine, with fine being the more precise of the two. The permission level and the details of the 
location request determine the accuracy of the information obtained via Google’s location 
services (“Making your app,” 2015). The 2010 study of Android apps showed that of the 50,000 
reviewed, 25% of the apps requested permission to the device coarse location, and 15% 
requested permission to the fine location. Examples of such apps include Facebook, Foursquare, 
and Twitter, as well as more obvious tools like mapping and navigation apps (Maus et al., 2011). 
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Indeed, the Android development tutorial offers an enticing pitch to developers to include 
location-based features in their app development tutorial (“Making your app,” 2015), noting the 
following: 
If your app can continuously track location, it can deliver more relevant information to 
the user. For example, if your app helps the user find their way while walking or driving, 
or if your app tracks the location of assets, it needs to get the location of the device at 
regular intervals. As well as the geographical location (latitude and longitude), you may 
want to give the user further information such as the bearing (horizontal direction of 
travel), altitude, or velocity of the device. (p. 5) 
This statement offers further insight into the capabilities and strategies of the device. It 
suggests that location information may be routinely updated at configurable intervals, with the 
update rate having reliability implications. It also implies that GNSS technology may be used, 
with its references to latitude and longitude, bearing, altitude, and velocity. Furthermore, it 
suggests some good application types to use for studying this topic, specifically navigation and 
tracking apps, in addition to those apps already mentioned. 
The tutorial goes on to lay out how developers code for this type of functionality. First, 
developers must ensure their applications have the proper permissions, as discussed previously. 
Coarse permissions are described as yielding locations with maximum accuracy within 
approximately one city block, while fine permissions are needed for functions requiring greater 
precision (“Making your app,” 2015). Permissions are disclosed to the user when they attempt to 
download or update an app from the Google Play market, and they must accept these in order for 
the download to proceed (State of Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012). Later, we 
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will examine how this arrangement figures into issues of user awareness and consent in terms of 
device location capabilities and monitoring. 
Having secured the proper permissions, developers must then program their app to 
request the device location. This may be done a single time, to request the device’s last known 
location, or it may be configured to receive regular location updates. The parameters of any of 
these location requests will affect the accuracy of the information, dictating the update interval 
and the priority level. The table below summarizes the different request types, as described in the 
Android developer tutorial (“Making your app,” 2015). 
Table 1 - Android Application Location Requests 
Request Type Description 
Balanced Considered coarse-level (max accuracy within 100 meters) 
Likely to use WLAN and cell towers to obtain device location, depending 
on availability 
High accuracy Most precise 
When used with fast update interval of 5 seconds, this request type can 
return information accurate within a few feet 
More likely to use GNSS 
Appropriate for mapping/navigation apps 
Low power Consumes less power 
City-level precision, accurate to within 10 kilometers 
No power Receive updates when available as other apps request location updates 
Accuracy dependent on permissions/request details of other application(s) 
   
The varying options for the location requests themselves reflect the inherent inverse 
relationship between accuracy prioritization and battery life, as well as the developers’ desire to 
balance the two. High accuracy requires high power consumption. There would also seem to be 
some correlation between these request parameter types and the app permission details. Indeed, 
in order for the high accuracy parameter to be implemented, an app must have permission to the 
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device fine location (“Making your app,” 2015). This implies that applications without such 
permissions may be less reliable sources of location data, when examining artifacts recovered 
from the device itself. This hypothesis helps shape the strategy of this study and will figure in the 
review of study findings. 
The Android tutorial essentially states that the fused location provider updates apps 
periodically with the best available location, and that the accuracy of the information depends on 
the active sensors (i.e., cellular, WLAN, GNSS), the location permissions, and the options in the 
app’s location request (“Making your app,” 2015). Thus, beyond identifying app types that may 
be of interest, the tutorial’s description of the fused location provider’s features might also 
suggest strategies for analyzing the data associated with those apps. For example, if applications 
log timestamped metadata about their activity, a review of this data could provide some insight 
into how reliable any associated, cached location information may be, by documenting its 
location request activity and details. This study’s methodology will include a search for such 
metadata. 
Clearly, the devices have many resources and many purposes involving location 
information. To date, much of the research involving the location-awareness features of Android 
phones has focused on the accuracy of tracking a live device as well as the review of historical 
cell site data obtained from cell phone carriers for a particular user. However, from a forensics 
perspective, many crimes are not reported or known until well after the incident, leaving 
investigators with a device seized later from an identified suspect and rendering live tracking 
moot. Furthermore, historical cell site data may not be accessible, or as we shall see in 
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subsequent sections, entirely reliable. Thus, the impetus and motivation for this study involves 
the recovery and reliability evaluation of the data recovered from the device itself. 
 
Existing Research on Location Data Recovery and Reliability 
Maus et al. (2011) noted that in general, locations derived by smartphones are generally 
quite accurate, in most cases. Empirically, this would make sense, since companies want users to 
enjoy and rely on their products, but it of course implies that the accuracy varies under different 
conditions. This section of the paper reviews the existing research on accuracy associated with 
device location services, as well as the recovery and reliability of the data recovered from the 
devices themselves.  
 
Accuracy of Device Location Services 
Much prior study has targeted the live tracking of devices, rather than data recovered 
from the devices after the incident. Even though this study focuses on the analysis of data 
recovered from the devices themselves, these works still inform the study methodology and 
shape hypotheses. Part of this work’s aims involve an assessment of the accuracy trends noted in 
live tracking with regard to location resources such as cellular data versus GNSS, for example. If 
these trends do hold, it will place a higher priority on developing strategies for reviewing device 
data to determine which resources were active when the recovered data was cached, or 
evaluating if such a determination is even feasible at all. 
In an excerpt from his upcoming book, Cellular Location Evidence for Legal 
Professionals, Larry Daniel (2014) states that two fundamental options exist for tracking a 
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device in real-time: activate the device GPS and request information via pings from the carrier 
side or triangulate the location using the cellular network. Daniel describes GPS as accurate to 
within 50 feet, while noting that triangulation demands three reference points and can err by up 
to several thousand feet. Each of these techniques has its own set of benefits and limitations. 
As noted earlier, GNSS-based services drain battery power quickly, require time and line 
of sight with several satellites to fix the device location, and can be subject to interference by 
atmospheric conditions, buildings and trees, or radio activity/jamming. On the other hand, the 
U.S. government reports that the civilian GPS service offers accuracy within 7.8 meters with a 
95% confidence level, making it an exceptionally accurate resource (Michael, 2013). Given that 
this service is now being used in conjunction with the Russian GLONASS system in newer 
devices, the effective accuracy may be even greater. Plus, as Professor David Last (2015) notes, 
GNSS services also often log additional metadata beyond just latitude and longitude information, 
including quality (accuracy) information, altitude, speed, and bearing. This additional metadata, 
if cached on the device, may be of use in evaluating the reliability of the recovered location 
history. This idea will be incorporated into this study’s evaluation of test results. 
Last (2015) also points out that an examiner can always check if the recovered 
coordinates make sense, lining up with travel routes or roads, for example. Furthermore, the 
precision of the coordinates and altitude may also offer some insight. For example, a decimal 
GPS coordinate with hundredths-level precision (two places after the decimal) is accurate to 
within 1,111.1 meters, but a coordinate with ten thousandths-level precision (four places after the 
decimal) can pinpoint locations within 11.1 meters. Too many places after the decimal point, 
however, may indicate that a particular coordinate is dubious or fabricated, because consumer-
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level technology in mobile devices is not typically capable of resolving locations to that level of 
precision (Bairstow, 2015). Since altitude is typically less accurate than latitude and longitude 
values, if the altitude seems quite accurate, the latitude and longitude data should be very 
reliable. Also, since one of the known GNSS issues involves atmospheric interference, an 
examiner can check for unusual solar activity at the time in question, as solar activity is well-
tracked and documented by multiple entities.  
This latest point highlights another way GNSS and cellular-based location features differ, 
in that at least a number of GNSS limitations can be evaluated after the fact, such as the solar 
activity or the topography of the region in question. However, a few major caveats apply to the 
use of cellular tower connections to locate a device, whether in a live tracking situation or in an 
effort to reconstruct location traces from historical cell site records obtained from the carrier. 
The primary issue arises from the assumption that a device will connect to the tower(s) 
nearest its current location. This assumption is problematic for a number of reasons. For multiple 
reasons, cell tower coverage varies and may not be known for a given time. Phones will connect 
to the tower with the best signal at the time, but since multiple factors affect cellular signals, that 
tower may not necessarily be the closest (Daniel, 2014). Some of the factors involve the tower 
infrastructure and operation, the local environment, and even the devices themselves (Wells, 
2014). The table below summarizes the various factors affecting phone-cell tower interaction.  
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Table 2 - Factors Affecting Cell Tower Activity 
Cellular Network/Operations Environmental Device 
Number of cell sites 
Ongoing maintenance or repairs 
Height of tower 
Height of tower above sea level 
Wattage output 
Range of coverage 
Number of antennas per tower 
Direction and height of antennas 
Call traffic via each antenna at 
time of connection 
Interference from other towers 
or radio signals 
Weather 
Topography (hills, trees, etc.) 
Urban structures (buildings, 
signs, etc.) 
Time of day 
 
Wattage output 
Broadband capability (age of 
phone) 
Indoor/outdoor at time of use 
 
In cases of live tracking, these complicating factors may be rendered moot when the 
device is actually located, but in cases involving historical cell site data, Daniel (2014) asserts 
that because of these issues, it is not possible to know the coverage area of a cell tower at the 
time of a particular event, nor is it possible to recreate exactly the conditions under which the 
event occurred, in terms of the cell coverage and operation. Furthermore, even if carriers 
maintain the location of each of their towers, one cannot know from the carrier’s records if the 
recorded tower was actually the one closest to the phone at the time. For example, even if a 
tower is closest, it may be inundated with heavy call traffic during peak activity times, forcing a 
phone to connect to a tower further away. These issues have significant implications for the use 
of these historical carrier records in the adjudication of criminal cases, as will be discussed in the 
next section of the paper. 
In terms of the accuracy of the cellular-based location derivations, varying results have 
been obtained. By working off just the single tower connected to and referring to carrier 
18 
 
maintained locations associated with that tower, accuracy levels within 100 to 3000 meters have 
been assessed. Triangulation techniques, available when a device communicates with multiple 
towers simultaneously or in rapid succession, have produced accuracy levels as precise as 25 
meters (Maus et al., 2011). How are these assessments performed, though? 
Yang et al. (2010) highlight the technique of wardriving, wherein “a vehicle drives within 
the target area recording signals emanating from nearby cell towers (or WLAN access points) 
and the locations these signals were received at.” They then use various mathematical strategies 
to infer the location of the various towers and access points detected during the collection phase. 
By comparing these inferred locations to the known locations of the towers in question, they 
evaluate the accuracy levels. 
Yang et al. (2010) performed their own wardriving effort around Los Angeles, an area of 
roughly 1396 square kilometers covered by 54 cell towers at the time. The team collected data, 
measuring signal strengths every two seconds as they drove around the area for a period of two 
months in 2009. Having gathered their data, they used techniques to infer locations of the towers 
they detected and compared the results to the known tower locations they had documented. They 
then developed their own supplemental mathematical strategies to refine those results, in an 
attempt to establish a way of improving the reliability of location data inferred from cellular 
tower interactions. The figure below provides a visual representation of the improvements to 
accuracy they were able to achieve via their innovative post-processing, as well as a quick 
comparison of the variations in accuracy among different environments, namely rural, 
residential, or urban areas (Yang et al., 2010). 
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Figure 1 - Cell Tower Localization Errors by Environment 
 
From these results, it would appear that cellular location information may be fairly 
reliable, generally much more so in urban and residential areas than in rural areas. Other 
researchers seem to corroborate this generalization, describing accuracy estimates as being 
within 50 to 100 meters in urban areas and some hundreds of meters elsewhere (Michael, 2013).  
Another study focused on identifying when a user is “dwelling,” or stationary, by 
tracking the user’s mobile device. Such concerns may figure in multiple contexts, from military 
operations to marketing strategies. The researchers created a custom Android application and 
collected information from five different devices with seven users. Users were directed to enable 
various settings at certain times and to track their own movements throughout their use of the 
devices. These researchers looked beyond cell towers and focused on the addition of GPS and 
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WLAN resources, as well as geolocation services, like Google location services or rival provider 
Skyhook (Brouwers & Woehrle, 2012). 
As might be expected, these researchers found that tracking information was most 
accurate when all of the aforementioned resources were involved, meaning GPS and WLAN 
sensors were enabled and access to geolocation services was facilitated. Again, geolocation 
services use the detected WLAN access points and signal strengths to query a remote database, 
which returns a location and estimate of accuracy based on the query information. The 
researchers noted that the best results typically involved the use of this service, although the 
quality of such information depends on the accuracy of the database and how many WLAN 
access points are actually in range at particular place. They found that static users would 
sometimes appear to jump between two points over 100 meters apart within seconds, as signals 
were detected and lost, etc. They also found that users moving at constant speed would appear to 
have clumped locations along their tracked route, rather than continuous travel, likely a sign that 
devices revert to most recent previously detected location when no new signal is detected. 
Furthermore, the use of geolocation services comes with a cost in terms of power consumption 
versus cellular only, especially if the rate of the queries is increased (Brouwers & Woehrle, 
2012). 
But how are these geolocation service databases developed? Who maintains them? How 
is their accuracy evaluated and improved?  
The “dwelling” researchers highlighted two key points that offer some response to these 
questions and also serve to guide some of the methodology of this study. First, they noted that 
Google’s geolocation service boasts reliable accuracy and extensive coverage. Secondly, they 
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offer some insight to its operation. According to Brouwers and Woehrle (2012), “Google trains 
its database using a background service built into Android devices that reports GPS coordinates 
and WLAN scan results to their servers at regular intervals” (p. 667). 
This indicates that Google’s database is likely to be extremely well-maintained, given the 
abundance of Android users and their ongoing participation in contributing to its improvement. It 
further suggests that Android users may not be particularly cognizant of their role in this 
maintenance effort, since it is a background service that is built into the devices that facilitates 
the activity. So does Google actually have a vast repository of location history information 
associated with its Android customers, and is that information at all accessible? Those questions 
also guided this study’s methodology and will be addressed in the study findings. 
However, other geolocation services, such as Skyhook (Brouwers & Woehrle, 2012), for 
example, certainly cannot enjoy Google’s access to Android user location updates. There are 
other ways of building geolocation databases, though. The aforementioned technique of 
wardriving may be employed. Service users may also contribute known location/access point 
information directly to the provider, as with Skyhook (Skyhook, 2015). Via wardriving, 
voluntary user contributions, and in Google’s case, Android background location services, 
various providers have been able to build geolocation service databases (Michael, 2013).  
Having elaborated on how the geolocation services are developed, operated, and 
maintained, the question turns to their reliability. One study evaluated Skyhook’s service, 
contrasting the company’s claims of 10-meter accuracy with results closer to 63-meter averages 
in Sydney, Australia, and 43 to 92 meters in Las Vegas, Miami, and San Diego (Michael, 2013). 
Yang et al. (2010) reference a study regarding wardriving and WLAN access points that found 
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that the estimated access point locations have a median error of 40 meters. Another group noted 
that WLAN access point locations can change (Davydov, 2011). However, Brouwers and 
Woehrle (2012) generally found geolocation services to be fairly accurate, especially when used 
in conjunction with other resources like GPS.  
 In summary, a review of the existing work involving smartphone location resources and 
their accuracy indicates a broad range of reliability estimates, from a few meters for GNSS 
information to a few kilometers for positions obtained via a single cell tower connection. The 
chart below offers a visual representation of the relative error ranges by resource type, with 
cellular on the order of thousands of meters, GNSS way down in the single to double digits, and 
WLAN resources overlapping between the two. Part of this study’s objectives will be to 
determine if any such accuracy trends are noted in the testing. 
 
Figure 2 - Relative Error Range by Resource Type 
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Recovery of Location Data from Devices 
 Studies related to location data recovered from the devices themselves appeared 
somewhat limited in scope and become dated quickly due to the fast-paced evolution of devices 
and applications, but they do offer some instructive insight. Various strategies are described by 
different researchers. Some are more direct than others, as the subsequent discussion will show. 
 Several works mentioned the need to “root” a device to extract all of the data (Davydov, 
2011; Kroger & Creutzberg, 2012; Maus, Hofken, & Schuba, 2011; Racioppo & Murthy, 2012; 
Sack, Kroger, & Creutzberg, 2012). The term “root” refers to the process of obtaining 
administrative, or root, access to the device’s operating system. This enables greater user control 
of the phone’s functionality and files, and it also ensures a forensic examiner the ability to obtain 
a complete raw image of the device’s internal memory (Racioppo & Murthy, 2012). Statistics on 
just what percentage of Android users root their phones proved elusive, but the process is 
specific to each particular make and model of the device, sometimes even varying depending on 
the device firmware version as well (Riley, 2015).  
 Also highlighted by multiple researchers are two files associated with older versions of 
Android, and therefore, older devices: cache.cell and cache.wifi (4RENSIKER, 2012; Kroger & 
Creutzberg, 2012; Yi, 2012). These files stored the 50 most recently detected cell tower locations 
and 200 most recent WLAN network locations, respectively. The information was timestamped, 
as well (4RENSIKER, 2012). However, researchers also noted that these files would only be 
populated with information if the user had enabled two specific settings which are not active by 
default (Kroger & Creutzberg, 2012). Furthermore, the files would only maintain the information 
up to the previously stated maximum record number, or for fourteen days (4RENSIKER, 2012).  
24 
 
 Instead of focusing on specific files of interest, some chose to hone in on certain file 
types, specifically SQLite databases and certain picture files. Racioppo and Murphy (2012) stress 
that SQLite databases are among the most important features of a smartphone, for forensic 
purposes, storing the bulk of the application data for Android apps. Among others, Yi (2012) 
discusses geo-tagged photos, images captured by the device’s camera that contain embedded 
latitude and longitude information. However, Yi also offers the more novel approach for photos 
of possible interest that are not geo-tagged: upload the image in question to Google Image search 
to find possibly similar images that are geo-tagged. More conventionally, Sack, Kroger, and 
Creutzberg (2012) also point out the potential value of Google Maps’ map tiles, which are 
snapshots of map images viewed via the application. 
Other examiners targeted specific apps, or categories of apps. For example, Saliba (2013) 
identifies the Facebook and Facebook Messenger apps as specific sources of location data, 
noting that the “threads_db2” database(s) associated with these apps store latitude and longitude 
values, along with altitude and speed, along with users’ message content. Maus et al. (2011) 
highlight other apps, such as Google Maps, Foursquare, and Twitter, as well as database content 
recovered from a weather app and a navigation app. Sack et al. (2012) also mention cookies and 
databases associated with the device’s web browser app. Davydov (2011) extends the 
consideration to all location-aware apps, naming example categories like navigation, social 
networking, weather, travel services, and banking.  
 Finally, when the traditional avenues of exploring known file types and applications of 
likely interest have been exhausted, the task shifts to identifying more elusive types of location 
artifacts. Artifacts stored as text addresses, points of interest, or navigation routes may require 
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additional search techniques (Barmpatsolou, Damopoulos, Kambourakis, & Katos, 2013). 
Strategies involve searching for geodata formats (GPS coordinates) or keywords like location, 
latitude, longitude, or address (Maus et al., 2011). Davydov (2011) suggests looking for logged 
MAC addresses of WLAN access points the device has detected, then looking up the associated 
location. The table below summarizes the various strategies utilized by previous researchers for 
recovering location data from Android devices. 
Table 3 - Strategies for Recovery of Location Data from Android Devices 
File Types App Categories Other 
SQLite Databases 
Pictures 
 Geo-tagged 
 Map tiles 
 Google Image Search 
 
Navigation 
Social networking 
Weather 
Travel 
Banking 
Text content 
Addresses 
Points of interest 
Routes 
Keywords 
MAC addresses of WLAN access 
points 
 
 While all of these insights are useful and certainly inform the methodology of this study, 
little comment on the accuracy of any such recovered data was observed. Davydov (2011) offers 
a discouraging assessment of prospects, noting that phones use cellular, GPS, and WLAN 
resources collectively to get location information, and there is no way to determine how 
particular data recovered from a device was obtained by that device. As an evaluation of his own 
proffered method regarding cached MAC address lookup, he notes that any location estimate so 
obtained may be of questionable accuracy. The relative lack of resolution regarding the 
reliability of the location information recovered from Android devices factored heavily into the 
motivation for this study.  
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Use of Mobile Device Location Data in Criminal Cases 
 Of course, the reliability of mobile device location data would be of interest in criminal 
cases where one or more of the parties involved used a smartphone during or around the incident. 
Sisak (2012, p. 2) notes that “the technologies that make smartphones so ‘smart’ also make them 
the closest thing law enforcement officers have to...homing devices.” Sisak also quotes one 
detective who points out the potential boon that the increasingly ubiquitous smartphone has 
brought investigators:  
It only makes sense for us to look for digital evidence. A crime is committed. People 
panic. They’re making calls. They’re sending text messages. All of that stuff is being 
digitally recorded and it’s going to be great evidence for prosecuting a case. (p. 1) 
The nature of who or what is recording the information becomes of interest. It could be 
service providers, law enforcement or other parties actively tracking a live device, or it could be 
cached by the device itself. Live tracking typically pertains to investigative operations, not 
prosecution strategies, though courts have ruled that using a phone’s GPS capability to track 
location does not require a warrant as law enforcement need no physical contact with the device 
to facilitate such operations (Harvard Law Review, 2013). However, the remaining two of these 
possibilities raises multifaceted concerns regarding the reliability and admissibility of the 
information, leading to qualified conclusions about how it should be used in court.  
The first category, data retrieved from service providers, has been the most studied and 
arguably, the most controversial. The general process involves a few preliminary steps: 
associating a device with a person of interest; identifying the phone carrier in question; and 
serving some sort of legal process (i.e., search warrant, subpoena, etc.) on the carrier for the 
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relevant call detail records. Then, an analyst examines the records and plots locations of cell 
towers on a map, assigns a coverage area to each tower, then plots pie-shaped sectors that 
represent possible locations from which particular cellular activity originated (Daniel, 2014). The 
resulting maps may be presented in court as evidence of where an individual could have been at 
or around the time of the crime, or to track past activity (Blank, 2011).  
This practice has been targeted from various angles. Critics question everything from 
how the records are obtained to their relevance and admissibility to their scientific validity. Even 
service providers have weighed in on the discussions, with AT&T filing a friend-of-the-court 
brief on a case involving records obtained via a court order, arguing that a search warrant should 
be required. Whether due to AT&T’s intervention or not, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that police do indeed need a search warrant for cellular location history (American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2014). A number of efforts to require search warrants for such records have 
been undertaken in courts and legislatures in California, Maryland, and Georgia. Though these 
did not all succeed, Washington state attorneys, for their part, are now advising law enforcement 
to obtain a search warrant when seeking cellular location data from service providers (State of 
Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012). 
In terms of relevance and admissibility, the path has been a bit smoother but still has 
some evolving nuances. Establishing the relevance of the records, or for data obtained via live 
tracking or from the device itself, has proven fairly straightforward. As long as a connection 
between the device and the person can be established, as when a phone is found in an 
individual’s possession or registered in their name, the location of the phone can certainly be 
germane. Furthermore, records from providers are admissible under the business records 
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exception to the hearsay rule, so long as they were obtained appropriately (Blank, 2011). Some 
argue that an expert witness should be required to testify to cellular records, since the average 
juror is unlikely to understand the technology well enough to use the information to judge the 
defendant fairly (Wells, 2014). 
Others would argue that introducing historical cellular location data via an expert witness 
would impart a weight to the information that may be unwarranted. The previous review of 
existing research attributed a broad and variable range of accuracy to cellular location 
information. Furthermore, Daniel (2014) asserts that such records do not meet the Daubert 
standard for scientific evidence. The Daubert standard sets out specific criteria governing the 
admissibility of expert findings. Daniel particularly highlights the requirement that processes be 
subject to peer review, have published error rates, and conform to standard, repeatable 
methodology. Daniel argues that location evidence from call detail records fails to meet any of 
these conditions. Specific findings may not be repeated or corroborated via peer review, since it 
is impossible to recreate all of the conditions at the time of the incident and it is likewise 
infeasible to know the exact distance between phones and towers at any given time. To be 
forensically sound, Daniel notes that a process must be predictable, repeatable, and verifiable. 
Once again, he argues that the use of call detail records to track a phone’s location fails on all of 
these counts.  
This leaves the data recovered from the device themselves. Presumably, such data would 
be easily admissible if law enforcement obtained a valid search warrant for the device, and if the 
device was collected from the subject, the association between user and device would easily 
cement the relevance of any recovered data. However, an interesting argument emerges, hinging 
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on application permissions. As stated previously, Android applications require permissions to 
access (and possibly cache or transmit) the device location, and users accept these permissions 
upon installing the app. Thus, an inference can be made regarding the user’s consent to the 
collection of their location data, which has been used to rebut their expectation of privacy with 
regard to the information. However, vague privacy policies presented by apps assuring users that 
the information is used “to improve services” or the like may obscure users’ awareness that their 
location history may be collected or used by other parties. This may undermine the easy 
assumption that cached location data should be accorded no special privacy protections (State of 
Washington Senate Judiciary Committee, 2012).   
In any case, privacy concerns continue to inform legal developments regarding mobile 
device location data, but Michael and Clarke (2013) argue that even if proper legal measures are 
indeed taken to obtain the data, it can still lead to a “miscarriage of justice” (p. 221) if the 
tracking data is not accurate. Indeed, both Blank (2011) and Daniel (2014) argue that the data 
can be helpful in refuting an alibi or demonstrate travel, for example. The issue arises from 
overstating the accuracy of the presented information. Ultimately, though, as Wells (2014) points 
out, the question of accuracy is for the jury to decide. The questions of reliability and authority 
still restrict the utility of mobile device location data in criminal cases. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Aside from the trend of heightened legal protection of device location information, 
additional challenges are emerging in the world of Android forensics, in general, and for location 
data recovery, in particular. These complications start with the devices themselves. Newer 
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versions of the Android operating system (KitKat and higher) have inherent security measures 
that prevent access to key device functions, some of which were previously utilized by forensic 
software developers and others to obtain full physical images of the phone’s internal memory. 
Now that those exploits may no longer be used, examiners must rely on the built-in Android 
backup functionality to extract data from the device. The main issue with this is that application 
developers can set a flag in their app’s code to exclude their app’s content from the backup 
process. Unsurprisingly, many stock Google applications appear to have this exclusion flag set. 
The ultimate consequence of this development is that even with a fully accessible, unlocked 
device, an examiner may still not be able to extract all of the phone’s data, including in some 
cases, the data of particular interest. This leaves examiners with complex rooting or custom 
recovery options that require significant research and testing, or they can opt for hardware-based 
options like the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG), In-System Programming (ISP), or chip-off 
methods that are time-consuming or potentially destructive, if they need to retrieve excluded or 
deleted data from a particular device (International Association of Computer Investigative 
Specialists, 2015). 
 Given that Google excludes many of its apps from the backup process, this begs the 
question of what other backup resources are available to users. Here we turn to the cloud. 
Google, of course, backs up contacts and emails associated with users’ Gmail accounts. Other 
providers like Facebook may keep messages or contacts on their servers, as well. Recovery of 
this data is a significant challenge, introducing a host of technical and legal issues. For example, 
the data may be stored across multiple servers that are geographically scattered. This complicates 
31 
 
jurisdictional issues and prevents the traditional approach of capturing a raw image of data, since 
the data must be identified and isolated before the extraction process (CelleBrite, 2015).  
 One prominent cell phone forensics company, CelleBrite, has developed a new tool 
called Cloud Analyzer, specifically designed to retrieve data from these remote resources. The 
tool utilizes the various providers’ own APIs to authenticate credentials and download content. 
Credentials may be manually entered, as in cases where owner consent has been obtained, or 
they may be recovered from account information extracted from a target device. In any case, this 
technique offers two inherent benefits. First, the use of the providers’ own interfaces and 
protocols means that whatever the provider would allow the user to access, the Cloud Analyzer 
software can also retrieve. Second, because this method also employs the user credentials, 
concerns over encryption and specificity are rendered moot. The data will be received in its 
decrypted state and only the authorized user data will be obtained (CelleBrite, 2015). 
 The latest development involves out-of-the-box encryption for new Android devices, 
running version 6.0, also known as Marshmallow. Google has mandated full-disk encryption be 
implemented by the time the user completes their device setup steps, though only for new 
Marshmallow devices that meet certain performance standards. The requirement will not extend 
to older devices upgrading to Marshmallow, but the concern from a data recovery standpoint is 
that this will introduce significant complications going forward and may result in an inability to 
extract any data from the devices, even via hardware-based methods that would normally extract 
the full device content (Cunningham, 2015). This development could place even more emphasis 
on cloud data. 
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 In summary, a heightened emphasis on securing device application functionality and user 
data has developed, raising new obstacles to software-based methods of capturing a complete 
extraction from newer Android devices. The simultaneously emerging shift from device-based 
storage of user data to cloud storage further complicates mobile device data recovery. This could 
place more emphasis on thorough analysis and understanding of what data is recovered from the 
device, as well as the cloud provider data. In any case, the recovery of any location data obtained 
from either source could prove crucial in a criminal case, and the ability to assess the accuracy of 
such data could figure heavily into its admissibility and impact.   
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 This study focuses on Android devices, since Android currently comprises the largest 
market share among mobile devices. Four different test phones were obtained, each a different 
make and model. The table below summarizes the features of each device, highlighting the 
differences in system version, network type, and hardware capabilities. These distinction mirror 
the wide variety of devices likely to be encountered in forensic casework. 
Table 4 - Test Device Information 
Make/Model LG VS870 
Lucid II 
Samsung SGH-i257 
Galaxy S4 Mini 
OnePlus One 
A0001 
Samsung SM-
G900P Galaxy S5 
Android OS 
Version 
(Status) 
4.1.2 
JellyBean 
(Unrooted) 
4.4.2 
KitKat 
(Unrooted) 
5.0 
Lollipop 
(Unrooted) 
5.0 
Lollipop 
(Unrooted) 
Carrier Verizon AT&T AT&T Boost Mobile 
Network Type CDMA GSM GSM CDMA 
GNSS Sensor(s) GPS GPS 
GLONASS 
GPS GLONASS GPS  
GLONASS 
 
 The decision not to root the devices was made for a number of reasons. First, a rooted 
device is the best-case scenario in terms of data recovery capabilities, but the goal of this study is 
to address the most typical scenario forensic examiners are likely to encounter. Since rooting is a 
complex and potentially damaging process, it seems likely that most users would not attempt to 
root their device. Thus, a rooted device would probably be an exception rather than the rule in 
forensic casework situations.  
 The devices were then prepped for the testing phase, with various location-aware 
applications installed and user accounts configured. These apps were specifically selected for 
their location functionalities, including permissions. Several application categories were chosen 
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for testing, including navigation/mapping, messaging/chat, fitness, weather, location sharing, and 
leisure activity apps. Ad-supported games were also installed, to see if any location data would 
be cached in relation to advertisements transmitted to the device based on its location. Devices 
and applications were configured with a view to optimizing the recovery of cached location data 
from the device. 
 Devices were used in 24 test sessions under controlled conditions. Recorded test 
parameters ranged from actual time and location to environment (rural, urban, or suburban) to 
enabled sensors (GNSS, WLAN, cellular, or combination), as well as careful documentation of 
user activity. Weather conditions were also noted, as well as which devices were used, of course. 
User activity involved navigation sessions, photo/video captures, chat and location sharing 
sessions, weather lookup, location searches, web searches, and/or workout recordings. The 
documentation was maintained to allow for a later evaluation of reliability regarding any 
extracted data. 
 After completing the device testing phase, work shifted to recovery of device data. At this 
point, issues with accessibility due to security implementations of later Android devices were 
encountered and documented. Successful extractions of each the devices were performed. One test 
device was subjected to an initial extraction, then a reset operation was performed. Following the 
hard reset, the device data was acquired again to determine if any location artifacts would be 
recoverable after the reset operation. All extracted data was then analyzed for location artifacts 
using various tools.  
 The analysis strategy began by identifying which apps had permissions to the device 
location. Permissions information is stored in the file title “packages.xml.” Some software utilities, 
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such as CelleBrite Physical Analyzer, will parse the permissions information from this file and 
report it in its list of installed apps. Once the apps with location permissions were identified, the 
associated application data for each was examined for location information. The examination 
followed much of the previously outlined strategy, focusing first on SQLite databases and geo-
tagged media files. Further analysis involved a search for possible textual location information, 
including addresses, destinations, points of interest, MAC addresses, etc. This latter step was 
effected via keyword searches and manual review of application data.  
 In addition, the Google Location History was retrieved for each test device using the 
specialized Cloud Analyzer software. These operations were performed using both the credentials 
obtained from the devices themselves, as well as a manual entry of the credentials, to see if the 
method used had any effect on the results. A third step involved the collection of one day’s worth 
of location history for one test device via the Google user account interface itself, accessible by 
logging into the account on the web. This data was retrieved to compare the collected cloud 
location history to the location data made available by Google to its users.  
All recovered location information was compared to the location data recovered from the 
devices themselves, as well as the known locations recorded in the test session documentation. 
This was done with a view to confirming the accuracy trends noted in the previous research, 
ranging from highly accurate GNSS data to the variable reliability of cellular network location 
information. The data was also examined for trends involving environmental impact, in terms of 
indoor versus outdoor activity and area type (rural, suburban, or urban).   
 From there, reviews of system logs, application code, databases, and text-based application 
data (XML files) were undertaken to see if any determinations about sensor activity could be made. 
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For example, if a location artifact was found in the web browser cache and timestamped with a 
particular value, it would be useful to be able to establish if the GNSS sensor was active at this 
time. If sensor activity could be ascertained for that timeframe, it could help bolster the reliability 
of the location artifact.  
 Another consideration was whether the mere presence or absence of certain information 
could be used to infer which sensors were active. For example, do certain applications only 
function or log data when the GNSS sensors are in use? Or do they still cache information but with 
null values for certain metadata like accuracy and altitude values? Will devices still geo-tag photos 
and videos if the GNSS services are not enabled? If an obvious trend could be observed in regards 
to these questions, it may have implications for the future accuracy evaluation of certain types of 
location data recovered from devices. 
 
 
 
 
  
37 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
Extraction Issues 
 Three of the devices were susceptible to physical extraction methods. One device, the 
OnePlus One A0001, running Android 5.0 (Lollipop), blocked the physical extraction since the 
device is running Lollipop and is not rooted. Furthermore, because of additional technical 
aspects of this device, all solutions for obtaining root access would require wiping the user data 
first. Thus, this device could only be analyzed logically via the ADB (Android Debugging 
Bridge) backup method.  
The other Lollipop device, the Galaxy S5, did have a physical extraction solution that 
does not involve wiping the user data, but to test the impact of resetting a device to allow root 
access, the ADB backup method was used on this device first. Then, the device was used once to 
take three photos, reset, and a physical extraction was successfully performed. The resulting 
physical extraction was examined to determine if information previously recovered via the ADB 
backup could still be located after the reset operation. For instance, keyword searches were 
performed for known latitude and longitude values recovered via the analysis of the ADB 
backup. These searches were unsuccessful, though the data was known to be cached in SQLite 
databases.  
Additional research into this apparent complication revealed that the SQLite databases in 
question store the latitude and longitude coordinates as “REAL” or “DOUBLE” (floating point) 
or “INTEGER” values. Therefore, a search for numeric strings consistent with coordinate values 
will not recover these artifacts, even if regular expressions or GREP techniques are used. A 
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potential solution involved attempts to carve out SQLite databases containing text terms like “lat 
REAL” and “latitude DOUBLE,” or similar variations. These search terms successfully returned 
hits on the actual databases containing the location artifacts, but no results of value were 
obtained when searching the unallocated space of the post-reset physical extraction. Searches of 
SQLite databases carved from the unallocated space were also negative.  
Clearly, recovery of location data stored in SQLite databases after resetting a device 
presents significant challenges. This underscores the need to mitigate risk when confronted with 
devices that are not inherently supported for software-based physical extraction. In some cases, 
where encryption is not involved, hardware-based techniques may be a better solution. Though 
they may require more time and expense, they can assure access to all of the device content 
without running the risk of resetting the device. 
Furthermore, as anticipated, certain applications were excluded from the ADB backup in 
the Lollipop device extractions. Notably, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Chrome browser, 
and Google Maps application data was excluded from the backups of these devices. On a 
positive note, these items were listed as installed applications by the forensic tools. A review of 
the “localappstate.db” database confirms that the apps were installed on the devices, as well as 
their installation time. In a case where Facebook Messenger or Google location data was needed, 
but the extraction failed to retrieve it, the investigator may wish to turn to the next resource 
discussed: the cloud. 
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Cloud Data Recovery 
 The first notable feature of the Cloud Analyzer software’s “Google Location History” 
extraction function is the 30-day range limit on location data. Presumably, this is a result of 
Google’s own imposed limitations capping the retrieval of history information even by users and 
devices to one month at a time. By repeating the extraction process and selecting different 
ranges, though, multiple months’ worth of locations were recovered for each test device. The 
figure below shows the Cloud Analyzer interface with the 30-day range selection requirement. 
  
 
Figure 3 - Cloud Analyzer Location History Options (30-day range) 
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Two methods exist for retrieving Google Location History. Both were tested and 
successfully used. The first method involves the export of a specialized account package from 
the CelleBrite Physical Analyzer (P.A.) software. This account package contains all of the user 
account credentials parsed by the P. A. software, as well as the unique Android device identifier. 
By utilizing this information, the software is essentially able to present the request for the 
location history via Google’s own API as though the device itself were retrieving the data. This 
offers a key advantage over the second method, in which examiners manually enter the account 
credentials. Manual entry generates a notification email from the provider, Google, to the 
accountholder regarding a new login from an unrecognized device. Use of the account package 
(device credentials) does not produce this alert to the user. This distinction was confirmed in the 
tests performed for this study. A notification email was received when the manual credential 
entry method was used but not with the account package method. Note that account packages 
could not be created for the Lollipop ADB backup extractions, as the Google account credentials 
are not recovered via this extraction method. For such situations, account credentials would have 
to be obtained via the device owner or other source and entered manually. 
 Both methods yielded the same results, and the results were very impressive. Latitude 
and longitude coordinates for the device locations were retrieved with a frequency of roughly 
one location per minute that the devices were up and running. Another initial observation was 
that the retrieved coordinates were in decimal format, and the precision of all recovered 
coordinates appeared to be limited to the thousandths place. This could have implications 
regarding the accuracy of the cloud location data. However, the frequency with which the device 
reports its location to Google was surprising, and certainly supports the idea that Google does 
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indeed have a vast cache of user location history information that could potentially be of great 
value in criminal investigations. Table 5 illustrates the frequency with which Google location 
updates are recorded for the device, based on a sampling of test results. The results displayed 
were selected to optimize for visualization of any trends noted among the different environment 
types and sensor activity, so some sessions with identical environment and sensor parameters 
were excluded from the table though they displayed similar trends. 
Table 5 - Average Cloud Location Frequency 
Device Number of 
Cloud 
Locations 
Up Time 
(minutes) 
Average 
Frequency 
(points/minute) 
Environment 
(Sensors Active) 
OnePlus One 22 25 0.88 
Suburban, Indoor 
(Cell, WLAN, GNSS) 
LG VS870 
OnePlus One 
118 
116 
105 
105 
1.12 
1.10 
Suburban, Outdoor 
(Cell, WLAN, GNSS) 
VS870 
OnePlus One 
84 
115 
105 
110 
0.80 
1.05 
Suburban, Outdoor 
(Cell only) 
S4 Mini 
Galaxy S5 
85 
86 
80 
82 
1.06 
1.05 
Urban, Outdoor 
(Cell, WLAN, GNSS) 
LG VS870 
OnePlus One 
56 
63 
71 
74 
0.79 
0.85 
Suburban, Indoor 
(Cell only) 
LG VS870 
OnePlus One 
51 
110 
50 
115 
1.02 
0.96 
Rural, Indoor 
(Cell, WLAN, GNSS) 
LG VS870 
OnePlus One 
43 
39 
49 
34 
0.88 
1.15 
Rural, Outdoor 
(Cell, WLAN, GNSS) 
LG VS870 
OnePlus One 
78 
118 
80 
121 
0.98 
0.98 
Suburban, Indoor 
(Cell, WLAN) 
S4 Mini 23 19 1.21 
Suburban, Outdoor 
(Cell, GNSS) 
LG VS870 27 26 1.04 
Rural, Outdoor 
(Cell only) 
Galaxy S5 0 10 0 
Suburban, Indoor 
(WLAN only) 
OnePlus One 0 60 0 
Suburban, Outdoor 
(WLAN, GNSS) 
 
42 
 
Some notable observations from this data include the fact that the trend of roughly one 
location per minute seems to persist across environment types and regardless of which services 
are active, with one notable exception: when test devices were used with cellular services 
disabled, no cloud locations were captured. Interestingly, a fitness app also used in one such test 
session did cache some location data for the same timeframe. However, the phenomenon could 
be an aberration, given that it involved just two devices in as many test sessions. More testing 
would be needed to confirm if this trend holds.   
 
Recovery of Device Location Data 
 Some location information was automatically parsed by the forensic software tools used 
to analyze the data from the test devices. This included Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and 
Viber chat message locations, some Google Maps and Waze navigation data, and geo-tagged 
media files. These artifacts are essentially the “low-hanging fruit,” as it were, so not much 
additional strategy is required to identify them. However, other data of possible value poses 
greater challenges. 
App and File Review 
 A review of the extracted data confirmed that the location cache files identified in 
previous studies, “cache.cell” and “cache.wifi,” were not recovered from any of the test devices, 
as expected based on the ages of the test devices. The file review then shifted to the next most 
obvious targets: geo-tagged photos and SQLite databases. In terms of geo-tagged photos, 
although they were identified by the analysis software immediately, the results were somewhat 
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muddled. For example, one might expect a trend in which geo-tagged photos would only be 
recovered from instances when the GNSS services were active. However, in some instances 
where GNSS services were noted as enabled and photos were captured, no geo-tagged photos 
were recovered. Two of the test devices, the Galaxy S5 and the Galaxy S4 Mini, recorded no 
geo-tagged photos, even though they were configured to do so and used to capture images. 
Furthermore, in two sessions on two separate devices, geo-tagged photos were recovered despite 
the fact that no GNSS services were enabled at the time of the session. Thus, an empirical basis 
for inferring sensor status from the mere presence or absence of geo-tag metadata in recovered 
images could not be determined. 
 Contributing further to the ambiguity, there was also no discernable pattern regarding the 
geo-tagged images captured at times when test session notes indicate the GNSS services were 
disabled. For example, in one instance, the test phone was indoors with cellular service only 
enabled, and the error was within roughly 130 meters from actual location. In another instance, 
however, the same phone was indoors with cellular and WLAN enabled, and the error was 
around 30 meters. A second test phone used in the same area as the first in the same outdoor, 
cellular-only test session appears to have geo-tagged the photo with a location over a kilometer 
away from the actual site of the photo.  
 The camera apps for all devices were configured during device setup to geo-tag photos, 
so a settings issue in the camera should not be responsible for the absence of geo-tagged photos 
from sessions in which the GNSS services were enabled. Weather conditions during such 
sessions were noted as being partly cloudy or clear. One possibly notable factor could be that 
other location-sensitive applications were also used in the sessions in which geo-tagged images 
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were captured in spite of the disabled GNSS services. Such applications, like Life360, a location-
sharing app, could have permissions to change the WLAN connection state, for example. This 
could potentially activate another resource for devices to obtain their location, though it is 
unknown if such a phenomenon resulted in the results observed here.  
Identifying Location-Permitted Apps 
 Having revisited the topic of permissions, the focus now shifts to apps with access to the 
device location. By examining the file titled “packages.xml,” various apps were identified which 
have access to either coarse or fine location, or more often both. The “packages.xml” file is a 
simple XML text file in which details about the installed applications are stored, including the 
app permissions. The permissions appear as a list and are organized by app. The figure below 
provides a snapshot of the permissions list for the RunKeeper fitness app. Note that this 
particular app only has access to the device “FINE” location. Based on the previous discussion 
regarding the maximum accuracies of both “COARSE” and “FINE” location permissions, this 
could indicate that the RunKeeper app data, if recovered, is likely to be quite accurate.   
 This idea is corroborated by observations made during test sessions regarding the 
RunKeeper app, as well as several other apps. Both the RunKeeper and MapMyWalk apps, for 
example, were noted to display a distance of “0.0” upon conclusion of workouts in which GNSS 
sensors were not enabled. A review of the associated databases for these apps confirms that no 
location data was cached for those particular sessions, just start and end times. In addition, the 
Waze navigation app insisted on “High Accuracy” mode being enabled by the user (including 
GNSS sensors) before performing navigation functions. Intuitively, this makes sense for the 
apps’ various functions, as navigation instructions would not be helpful if they were not finely 
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attuned to the device’s actual location, and fitness apps aim to provide users a track of their 
workout waypoints to facilitate measurements of improvement over successive workouts. For 
this reason, an investigator may wish to test a particular application of possible interest on a 
control device for evidence of this type of app-specific settings requirement. Doing so may allow 
an examiner to gain some insight into the reliability of similar data recovered from the evidence 
item. 
 
Figure 4 - RunKeeper Permissions from “Packages.xml” with “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION” 
 
 Returning to the topic of permissions, a couple of other comments on the “packages.xml” 
file are warranted. First, the Physical Analyzer software does parse out a list of installed 
applications, including a summary of their permissions. However, it does not go into detail about 
coarse versus fine locations and so on. A quick “Find” search of the “packages.xml” file in 
46 
 
Internet Explorer for the terms “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION” and 
“ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION” will enable an investigator to identify each app that could 
potentially store location information based on its permissions. The app name and path appear 
above the list of its associated permissions, as shown in Figure 4. It is also important to note that 
the “packages.xml” file appears to have been excluded from the Android backup for the Lollipop 
test devices. 
 Given that the apps used in the test sessions were specifically chosen because of their 
location permissions, the focus of this study shifted quickly to reviewing the SQLite databases 
associated with each app. In general, the examination of app databases quickly made clear that 
location-sharing and fitness apps seem to cache the most data, frequently with high update rates 
and accuracy. They also seem most likely to cache other location metadata, like accuracy and 
altitude. Navigation and mapping apps seemed to do less logging of actual track points, focusing 
more on search results and recent destinations, but Waze did have a database named “tts.db” that 
contains timestamped turn-by-turn directions. These could certainly play a key role in 
reconstructing an individual’s activity, though not necessarily with the minutiae of a true 
tracking device.  
 Many databases were found to store location-related content. The trick was in 
determining the nature of the cached information. Was it consistent with the device’s actual 
location as noted in the test session documentation? Or was it based more on searched locations 
or destinations? What metadata was cached within the databases? Table 6 below details twenty-
six of the recovered databases of possible interest by filename, along with a brief description of 
their content. The databases are presented with their associated app, with the apps divided into 
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seven distinct categories. A detailed description of SQLite database analysis follows, 
highlighting specific databases of interest that were recovered from the test devices. 
Table 6 - Databases of Interest 
App 
Category 
Database Name Source App Content 
Navigation/ 
Mapping 
 
gmm_storage.db Google Maps searched locations, 
directions. Stored in BLOB 
data. Manual review or 
strings/keyword searches 
required. 
suggestions.db Google Earth searched locations 
(addresses or points of 
interest), with timestamps 
tts.db Waze turn-by-turn directions 
(transcript), with 
timestamps 
user.db Waze recent locations with 
lat/long and timestamps 
Fitness 
 
mytracks.db MyTracks Workout session history, 
timestamped trackpoints, 
with metadata (accuracy, 
etc.  
RunKeeper.sqlite RunKeeper Workout session history, 
timestamped trackpoints, 
with metadata (accuracy, 
etc.) 
workout.db Map My 
Walk 
Workout session history, 
timestamped trackpoints, 
with metadata (accuracy, 
etc.) 
Location 
Sharing 
360LocationDB Life360, 
FriendLocator 
Location history with 
timestamps and metadata 
(accuracy, altitude, etc.) 
messaging.db Life360, 
FriendLocator 
Chat messages with lat/long 
and timestamps 
nc.db Life360 Notifications with extra text 
metadata (timestamps and 
lat/long) 
dumpLogsDatabase FriendLocator Detailed activity log, with 
connections, request details, 
and locations info, 
timestamps (lengthy text 
format, manual recovery or 
keyword searches needed) 
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App 
Category 
Database Name Source App Content 
Location 
Sharing 
fsq.db Swarm Recent locations with 
lat/long and timestamps 
Chat 
threads_db2 Facebook 
Messenger 
chat messages with user 
location (lat/long) and 
timestamps 
viber_messages Viber chat messages with user 
location (lat/long) and 
timestamps 
msgstore.db WhatsApp chat messages with user 
location (lat/long) and 
timestamps 
naver_line LINE chat messages with user 
location (lat/long) and 
timestamps 
Leisure 
scout.db FieldTrip Locations of viewed points 
of interest with view 
timestamp 
Weather 
oneweather.db OneWeather saved locations, including 
lat/long, timestamps of last 
hit 
weather.db GO Weather Recent locations, including 
lat/long and timestamp 
forecast_accu.db Accuweather saved location to display in 
widget (not necessarily 
current location) 
Other 
ContextLog_0.db Pre-installed 
Samsung 
app/feature 
Tracks app 
launches/sessions with 
timestamps and duration of 
activity 
event Pre-installed 
Amazon 
shopping app 
WLAN/cellular data usage 
stats with timestamp  
herrevad Google 
Mobile 
Services 
WLAN network history 
with BSSID (MAC address) 
and timestamps 
https_www.google.com_0.localstorage web browser searched terms, lat/long, 
with timestamps 
NetworkUsage.db Google 
Mobile 
Services 
some WLAN/cellular data 
usage stats with timestamp  
locdatabase Android 
Location 
Tracker 
logs with lat/long and 
timestamps 
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SQLite Database Analysis – Fitness App Example 
SQLite databases store content in tables, which in turn contain records associated with 
particular rows and columns. Often, content of interest is stored in multiple tables or in a format 
that is less intuitive to the human reader, such as timestamps stored in UNIX milliseconds format 
rather than the typical month/day/year, hour/minute/seconds format we are used to seeing. Many 
utilities exist for viewing and extracting data from these files. In this case, SQLite Studio was 
used to extract information of interest from the recovered databases. Custom queries were 
created to retrieve the relevant location content. To illustrate the method used, the following 
figures depict an example database, the RunKeeper app’s “RunKeeper.sqlite” database, as well 
as the query and its results. Query results were output into Excel spreadsheets to facilitate further 
data review, comparison, filtering, and the like. 
 
Figure 5 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, trips table 
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Figure 6 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, points table 
 
Figure 7 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, query converting timestamps and combining content from 
trips and points tables 
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Figure 8 - RunKeeper.sqlite database, query results 
This database offers a few noteworthy observations. First, the precision of the latitude 
and longitude values extends well beyond the cloud data’s thousandths-place level, all the way to 
eight places after the decimal, or to one hundred-millionths place. In addition, the timestamps are 
also incredibly precise, stored in UNIX epoch milliseconds format. This is typical of many 
Android applications and was noted in the majority of the examined databases. Furthermore, the 
update intervals, as noted in the “time_interval_at_point” column, are quite frequent, occurring 
multiple times per minute. This was also noted to be a common trait among databases associated 
with the other tested fitness apps, MyTracks and MapMyWalk. The other two fitness apps also 
exhibited the same behavior in test sessions, failing to report a distance or cache workout 
waypoints when the GNSS service was not active. If these observations are any indication, 
recovered fitness app data is likely to be quite precise to the actual device location, quite accurate 
due to GNSS sensor use requirement, and frequently updated, making it a potentially valuable 
resource in an investigation in which it is available. 
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Chat and Location-Sharing Apps 
The chat and location-sharing apps also seemed to cache the actual device location with 
significant precision. However, the chat apps seem more likely to be parsed by the commercial 
forensic software tools, such as Internet Evidence Finder and CelleBrite Physical Analyzer. The 
following tables display examples of the content obtained from the various chat applications 
which cached location data, as recovered by the commercial software tools used in this study.  
Table 7 - Selection of content recovered from Viber app's "viber_messages" database as reported 
by Internet Evidence Finder 
Sender Recipient(s) Message Sent 
Date/Time - 
(UTC) 
(MM/dd/yyyy) 
Message Message 
Status 
Latitude Longitude 
TestPhone 
Gsmone 
 09/16/2015 
01:55:16 PM 
Orlando today! Received 27.8014691 -82.3025061 
-Not Found- , TestPhone 
Gsmone 
09/16/2015 
01:55:35 PM 
Sho nuff! Sent / 
Delivered 
27.8014233 -82.3024485 
-Not Found- , TestPhone 
Gsmone 
09/16/2015 
01:56:18 PM 
No location 
now? 
Sent / 
Delivered 
n/a n/a 
TestPhone 
Gsmone 
 09/16/2015 
01:56:28 PM 
We'll see Received 27.8014691 -82.3025061 
-Not Found- , TestPhone 
Gsmone 
09/16/2015 
01:57:04 PM 
How bout now? 
I re-enabled it 
Sent / 
Delivered 
27.8014181 -82.3024472 
TestPhone 
Gsmone 
 09/16/2015 
01:57:11 PM 
Cool Received 27.8014691 -82.3025061 
TestPhone 
Gsmone 
 09/16/2015 
01:57:20 PM 
Mine is always 
enabled 
Received 27.8014691 -82.3025061 
-Not Found- , TestPhone 
Gsmone 
09/16/2015 
01:57:25 PM 
Nice Sent / 
Delivered 
27.8014181 -82.3024472 
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Table 8 - Selection of content recovered from Facebook Messenger app's "threads_db2" database 
as reported by CelleBrite Physical Analyzer 
From Body Location Timestamp: 
Date 
Timestamp: 
Time 
100009025428140 
Testphone Gsm 
1 - This message sent from A0001 to 
VS870 at 4211 N. Lois Ave. Tampa. 
Active services-  cellular, WiFi, and gnss 
(27.977825,  
-82.513403) 
5/27/2015 5/27/2015 
10:04:33 
PM(UTC+0) 
100009025428140 
Testphone Gsm 
2 - This message sent from A0001 to 
VS870 at 4211 N. Lois Ave. Tampa. 
Active services-  cellular, WiFi, and gnss 
(27.977825,  
-82.513403) 
5/27/2015 5/27/2015 
10:05:22 
PM(UTC+0) 
100009025428140 
Testphone Gsm 
3 - This message sent from A0001 to 
VS870 at 4211 N. Lois Ave. Tampa. 
Active services-  cellular, WiFi, and gnss 
(27.977825,  
-82.513403) 
5/27/2015 5/27/2015 
10:06:08 
PM(UTC+0) 
 
As illustrated in the tables, the cached latitude and longitude values are quite precise, 
with Viber recording up to the ten-millionths place and Facebook Messenger up to the 
millionths. However, although these location coordinates are quite precise, they are only cached 
when a message is sent. Locations can also be recovered for the remote conversation partner, not 
just the local device from which the data was retrieved, as seen as in the Viber messages above. 
No location data was recovered for messages sent during test sessions when the GNSS services 
were disabled, interestingly. Also, no locations were stored by the other two chat apps tested, 
WhatsApp and LINE, even though the apps were configured to share locations with chat 
conversation partners. 
In general, the location-sharing apps also report the device’s current location, and they do 
so with great precision. Although no SQLite databases containing location data were recovered 
for the Glympse app, several source databases were identified for the other applications. Life360 
and Locate My Friends are apps from the same developer, generating databases with the same 
names, just under different directory paths. Swarm is associated with Foursquare, so its primary 
database is named and formatted similarly, as well. One interesting finding from the review of 
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these databases is that the precision of the cached coordinates seemed to vary, with coordinates 
associated with messages sent via the apps’ interfaces reported with an even greater number of 
values after the decimal point. It’s also important to note that the coordinates appeared rounded 
to the nearest degree when viewed within the CelleBrite Physical Analyzer’s internal SQLite 
database view. The following figures show the precision with which the Locate My Friends app 
(and its sister application, Life360) records latitude and longitude values, as viewed from within 
the Physical Analyzer and SQLite Studio interfaces, for messages and cached locations. 
 
Figure 9 - Contents of the Locate My Friends app's "messaging.db" database as viewed within 
Physical Analyzer (coordinates rounded to nearest degree) 
 
Figure 10 - Contents of the Locate My Friends app's "messaging.db" database as viewed within 
SQLite Studio (more precise coordinates) 
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Figure 11 - Contents of the Locate My Friends app's "360LocationDB" database, SQLite query 
results. High precision coordinates noted, but less precise than those associated with messages 
found in "messaging.db." 
  These figures demonstrate the higher precision ascribed to coordinates associated with 
the app’s chat messages, as recorded in the “messages.db” database, versus the cached locations 
stored in the “360Location” database. The message coordinates may even be too precise to be 
genuine, based on the previous discussion of coordinate precision levels in consumer-grade 
devices. In addition, the timestamps reflect fairly frequent update intervals of roughly fifteen 
minutes for the stored location points, while the chat message coordinates are dependent on the 
sending of messages. It is also notable that the “provider” is noted as “fused” in the 
“360LocationDB” database, indicating that the Google location services’ Fused Location 
Provider API is used by this application.  
Other findings from the analysis of the location sharing apps’ databases included the 
obliteration of older records. Test session documentation shows these apps were used in multiple 
sessions prior to the earliest records recovered from the extracted databases. This was consistent 
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among the Locate My Friends, Life360, and Swarm apps, across all devices. Also, each of the 
aforementioned apps cached locations for sessions in which the GNSS services were noted as 
disabled in the test session documentation. In short, these apps cached very precise data, with 
moderate or conditional update intervals, appear not to store locations indefinitely, and will store 
coordinates even when GNSS sensors are not enabled by the user. 
Leisure and Navigation Apps 
Alternatively, the leisure apps tested seemed more likely to record searched destinations, 
rather than the actual device location. As an example, the Foursquare app caches recently viewed 
venues but does not specify the location of the device at the time the search was executed. 
Empirical use of these applications suggests that the viewed venues will generally be nearby 
points of interest, as related to the device location at the time of the search. However, in a 
retroactive analysis situation, this would be an inference and is not documented directly in the 
app’s databases. It could be corroborated with other sources, however, such as Google Location 
History or carrier cell tower location records. The table below displays the content retrieved from 
the Foursquare app’s “fsq.db” database, as recovered from the OnePlus One A0001 test device. 
Table 9 - Content of Foursquare's "fsq.db" database, extracted via SQLite query 
last_viewed Converted 
Time (UTC) 
name loc_lat loc_long loc_address loc_city 
1442418216 9/16/2015 15:43 East Coast 
Pizza 
27.79071808 -82.34282684 13340 Lincoln 
Rd 
Riverview 
1442606556 9/18/2015 20:02 Starbucks 27.98117065 -82.48847961 2720 W Dr 
Martin Luther 
King Jr Blvd 
Tampa 
1442606575 9/18/2015 20:02 Brio Tuscan 
Grille 
27.9652195 -82.52071381 2223 N West 
Shore Blvd 
Tampa 
1442606589 9/18/2015 20:03 Cigar City 
Brewing 
27.95913696 -82.50926971 3924 W Spruce 
St 
Tampa 
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 Other leisure apps stored location content in text-based XML files, as did the Field Trip 
app. Two files titled “lastLocation.xml” and “lastNotification.xml” were recovered from the 
Field Trip app’s directory. These files contained precise latitude and longitude values with 
timestamps but they were stored only for the most recent activity. The cached coordinates appear 
to relate to the actual device location and were consistent with the actual test session location, 
within 100 meters. Another noteworthy finding is that these coordinates were cached at times 
when the GNSS services were disabled on the test device, the LG VS870, in this case.  
 
Figure 12 - Content of the Field Trip app's "lastLocation.xml" file 
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Figure 13 - Content of the Field Trip app's "lastNotification.xml" file 
 Falling somewhere in between the fitness and leisure apps, the navigation apps store both 
searched locations and in some instances, the actual device location at the time of the search. 
Two databases among the Waze navigation app data demonstrate this dichotomy. The “user.db” 
database contains destinations to which the user has navigated via the Waze app. The “tts.db” 
offers a rather less conventional twist on pinpointing the device location, by transcribing the 
turn-by-turn directions with timestamps. Extracted content from both databases is displayed in 
the tables below to illustrate the different storage strategies, highlighting data for the same 
navigation session from each database. 
Table 10- Destination data extracted from the Waze app's "user.db" database, RECENTS and 
PLACES tables, using SQLite query 
name city state longitude latitude created_time Converted Created 
Time (UTC) 
The 
Proper Pie 
Company 
Davenport FL 
 
-81.638595 
 
28.214551 1442438167 9/16/2015 21:16:07 
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Table 11 - Turn-by-turn directions recovered from Waze app's "tts.db" database, using SQLite 
query 
text path Converted 
Time (UTC) 
145 Ridge Center Drive database//Jane//1442438170-504860-
238.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
The Proper Pie Company database//Jane//1442438170-504890-
239.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
Let's take SR-417 S, and I-4 W database//Jane//1442438170-504890-
240.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
exit to Exit 3: Osceola Pkwy (toll) database//Jane//1442438170-517373-
241.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
exit right to Exit 3: Osceola Pkwy (toll) database//Jane//1442438170-517373-
242.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
stay to the right to Osceola Pkwy database//Jane//1442438170-517404-
243.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
stay to the left to I-4 W / Tampa database//Jane//1442438170-517404-
244.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
turn left on Citrus Ridge Dr database//Jane//1442438170-529093-
245.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
turn left on Majesty Dr database//Jane//1442438170-529093-
246.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
then turn left database//Jane//1442438170-529124-
247.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
then turn left on Majesty Dr database//Jane//1442438170-529124-
248.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
you'll arrive at The Proper Pie Company database//Jane//1442438170-531260-
249.tts 
9/16/2015 
21:16:11 
 
Clearly, there is some ambiguity regarding the timestamps of the turn-by-turn directions, 
with multiple instructions timestamped identically. However, they do show evidence of a 
navigation route request, which may be indicative of travel or intent to travel by the user. 
Digging a little deeper, we see that Waze is actually caching the original location and timestamp 
of the search in a separate text file, titled “waze_log.txt.” This file actually does contain the 
device’s precise latitude and longitude value at the time the navigation request was initiated, as 
well as the coordinates of the destination. Figure 14 shows the relevant excerpt from this log file, 
with the timestamp (blue), origin coordinates (yellow), and destination coordinates (green) 
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highlighted. The recorded data is consistent with test session activity, and since this app’s 
navigation function requires the GNSS service, the cached location is quite accurate. 
[17:16:07.696 Warning] First routing id: 1442438168  [navigate_route_trans.c:381 
(navigate_route_init_context)] 
[17:16:07.696 Warning] 
UID,842961612,ChBWNTBHNnNYa2xZN2hvd3RBEJK3568FGAwiA3VzYSjMpfqRAw,203 
At,-81.301666,28.370980,-0.000006,257,3,53135374,53135286 
RoutingRequest,1442438168,3,-10,1,-1,1000,-81301679,28371032,-1,53135374,53135286,SR-417 
S,F,-81638595,28214551,-1,-1,-1,Ridge Center 
Drive,T,T,T,26,1,F,2,T,3,F,4,T,5,F,6,T,7,T,8,T,10,F,12,F,13,F,16,T,32,T,0,145,Davenport,FL,62167,0,
F,-1,4,257,-1,-1,-1,-1,-
81301679,28371032,257,F,2,twitter,0,facebook,0,0,googlePlaces.ChIJNUVHYI5w3YgRUB2XohCuq
bE,,,  [RealtimeNet.c:3902 (RTNet_RequestRoute)] 
Figure 14 - Navigation request from Waze app's "waze_log.txt" text file 
 
Browser, Weather Apps, and Games 
In addition, some less intuitive sources of location data include files associated with the 
web browser, weather apps, and ad-supported games. The web browser stores “localstorage” 
databases containing website-specific content cached for later visits, named with the website 
URL with the “.localstorage” extension. Other apps can store these databases within their own 
directories, as well, but the web browser’s collection are discussed here. The browser’s 
“localstorage” databases are specific to the particular website visited and can contain probative 
user-generated information. In the case of the www.google.com website’s “localstorage” 
database, this can include search terms and location data, as shown in the figure below. 
61 
 
 
Figure 15 - Content of web browser's "https_www.google.com_0.localstorage" database, 
showing search terms, location coordinates, and timestamps 
 The content is stored as BLOB data, and its organization makes the recovery of the data a 
bit cumbersome, but the data recovered from this database was consistent with the test session 
activity. This database was only recovered for the two non-Lollipop devices for which physical 
extraction without root privileges was supported, but in both instances, the cached coordinates 
had timestamps associated with test sessions in which the GNSS services were enabled, and their 
precision was at least millionths-place level. The data is only recorded when a user actually 
conducts a search via Google.  
 Weather apps also appeared to cache some locations, although there may be some 
ambiguity regarding whether they were the actual device location or just a user-requested 
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location. The OneWeather app did have one database that cached apparent device locations, but 
the precision was fairly low, only one hundredths-place level. Alternatively, the AccuWeather’s 
“forecast_accu.db” database stores more precise coordinates, but they may not be associated with 
the device’s actual location. Fortunately, in this case, the database actually flags whether or not 
the stored information is the device’s actual current location. The following tables display the 
varying types of location information recovered from the tested weather apps. 
Table 12 - OneWeather app's "oneweather.db" cached locations, from geocodes table, showing 
device location history 
city state country lat lng lastHit  
Converted Timestamp 
(UTC) 
hits 
Riverview FL US 27.8 -82.3 9/16/2015 15:11:24 4 
Tampa FL US 28.13 -82.38 6/6/2015 23:17:10 1 
Tampa FL US 27.98 -82.51 6/9/2015 17:26:24 1 
Tampa FL US 28.11 -82.37 6/9/2015 23:24:27 1 
Tampa FL US 27.98 -82.52 6/10/2015 13:57:22 1 
Durham NC US 35.94 -78.92 7/14/2015 15:41:23 3 
Hamptonville NC US 36.07 -80.81 7/15/2015 11:58:59 3 
Hamptonville NC US 36.05 -80.79 7/15/2015 15:01:54 1 
Goldsboro NC US 35.34 -77.9 7/17/2015 14:46:33 1 
New Bern NC US 35.14 -76.97 7/17/2015 15:52:07 1 
Tampa FL US 28.14 -82.33 9/5/2015 14:04:15 1 
Wesley 
Chapel 
FL US 28.19 -82.35 9/5/2015 15:09:51 1 
Wimauma FL US 27.76 -82.26 9/19/2015 14:18:41 1 
Tampa FL US 27.95 -82.46 9/19/2015 23:40:47 1 
  
Table 13 - AccuWeather app's "accu_forecast.db" database content showing stored user-
configured location, not actual device location 
current_city_flag Converted 
Timestamp (UTC) 
city country lat lon 
FALSE 10/2/2015 11:16:04 Bremen Germany 53.07561 8.80934 
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 Venturing beyond database review, the weather apps also seemed to cache location data 
within text-based files, such as the AccuWeather app’s “accuwx_locations” and 
“accuwx_geococder_cache” files. These files appear to contain historical location information 
for the device, including coordinates and addresses, but they do not appear to store associated 
timestamps for each entry. The following figures show snippets of some the content recovered 
from these files. 
{"adminAreaId":"FL","alias":"Balm","canonicalLocationKey":"2245533","canonicalPostalCo
de":"33598","countryId":"US","dmaId":"539","geocodedAddress":{"addressLine1":"13012 
CR-672","addressLines":[],"adminArea":"FL","country":"United 
States","formattedAddress":"13012 CR-672, Riverview, FL 
33579","latitude":27.7632628,"locality":"Riverview","longitude":-82.2658239, 
"maxAddressLineIndex":0} 
Figure 16 - Content of AccuWeather app's "accuwx_locations" file 
[{"Latitude":27.763,"Longitude":-82.266},[{"addressLine1":"13012 CR-
672","addressLines":[],"adminArea":"FL","country":"United 
States","formattedAddress":"13012 CR-672, Riverview, FL 
33579","latitude":27.7632628,"locality":"Riverview","longitude":-82.2658239, 
"maxAddressLineIndex":0}] 
Figure 17 - Content of AccuWeather app's "accuwx_geocoder_cache" file 
Finally, some ad-supported games obtain device location information, enabling 
advertisers to tailor their ads to a user’s surroundings. In the case of the apps tested, the location 
information was not found in SQLite databases but in various text-based files. One example 
involves the Words With Friends app’s “iad.dat” file, which was located in the 
“\data\com.zynga.wwf2.free\files\.mmsyscache” directory. This file contained some apparent 
location coordinates, however, they were not consistent with documented test session activity, 
though still within the same general geographic region (same county). This was true even though 
the device had access to the device FINE location, based on its permissions. The figure below 
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shows the content as recovered from the file, with very precise coordinates (yellow), as well as a 
notable reference to the device connection type (green). 
"pkid":"com.zynga.wwf2.free","campaignid":"172693","idfa":""}},"respo
nse":{"adType":"INTERSTITIAL","creativeHeight":-1,"creativeWidth":-
1,"cdfId":"e1e4a6d7-1780-46b3-9876-
616b5b1393c1"},"ruleVariableValues":{"portraitwpx":360,"osVersion":{"
versions":[4,1,2],"versionCount":3},"mobileOS":"ANDROID","compilersdk
":{"major":"FIVE","minor":"FOUR","subminor":"ZERO","type":"a"}},"inst
anceCompilerOptions":{},"creativeId":"e1e4a6d7-1780-46b3-9876-
616b5b1393c1","mobileOS":"ANDROID","osVersion":{"versions":[4,1,2],"v
ersionCount":3},"deviceHeight":640,"deviceWidth":360,"location":{"lat
itude":28.082199096679688,"longitude":-
82.5239028930664,"accuracy":0.0},"placementWidth":-
1,"placementHeight":-1,"userAgent":"Dalvik/1.6.0 (Linux; U; Android 
4.1.2; VS870 4G 
Build/JZO54K)","language":"en","connectionType":"WIFI"," 
Figure 18 - Content of Words With Friends app's "iad.dat" file, showing latitude and longitude 
values and connection type 
 
App Trends 
As the preceding analyses indicate, location data is cached on these devices in a variety 
of file types, and many different types of applications can be potential sources of valuable data. 
Searches for location data may be facilitated by manual review of database content, keyword 
searches for possible text content and database column names of interest, and of course, review 
of geo-tagged photos. The recovered location data may reflect the device’s location or 
destinations and points of interest searched for by the device user.  
Chat, location sharing, and fitness apps typically record the actual device location, with 
varying, usually frequent update intervals and typically requiring a user interaction to initiate the 
location caching. The web browser’s “localstorage” databases also seem to follow this trend. The 
chat and web browser apps only update location information upon a user action, such as a sent 
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message or a web search, respectively. These apps seem to save this data indefinitely or until 
user deletion, and they appear to require enabled GNSS services to cache location data.  
Leisure apps, on the other hand, seem more likely to store searched or viewed locations, 
with only most recent device location information cached. They do appear to retain points of 
interest permanently but do require user interaction to initiate any data caching, as well. They do 
not appear to require GNSS sensor activity. Navigation and weather apps present a hybrid 
approach, recording some actual device coordinates, not always with timestamps, but also 
including searched locations or destinations. These apps appear to preserve the cached 
information but also require user activity to initiate record keeping. The Waze navigation app 
specifically requires GNSS functionality to perform the navigation function. Location artifacts 
recovery from ad-supported game data proved somewhat nebulous, with the highlighted example 
demonstrating possible unreliability of the stored coordinates.  
Depending on the nature of the application, the recovered location data could be used to 
pinpoint a device’s location at a particular time, demonstrate dwelling or travel, or illustrate a 
user’s interest or intent to travel to a particular point of interest. The resulting findings could be 
used to implicate a particular individual, refute or confirm an alibi, or corroborate witness 
statements, as a few examples. While certain artifact or application types may be automatically 
parsed by commercial forensic tools, examiners should also target both SQLite databases and 
text-based files to recover possible location data of interest, focusing on apps with permissions to 
the device location. 
If a particular application is found to store data of interest, an examiner could further 
consider installing the app of interest on a test device to better understand its behavior. For 
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example, the examiner could attempt to determine if the app requires GNSS services to perform 
its function or cache location data. This could have implications regarding the accuracy of the 
recovered data. He or she could also evaluate if the application continues to cache data in the 
background, or if any recovered data must the result of direct user interaction. Of course, app 
functionality can vary from version to version, so an examiner would need to consider this 
limitation when attempting such evaluations. However, by making this effort, an examiner may 
be able to obtain greater insight into his/her findings and thus be equipped to present the results 
with greater confidence and clarity. 
 
Metadata and Logs 
 As seen in the previous review of the Waze app data, apps can and do store location data 
in text and log files, not just in SQLite databases. However, as shown in Table 6, some app files 
also appear to store metadata associated with device network connectivity that may be helpful in 
evaluating the accuracy of cached coordinates. For example, the Locate My Friends app’s 
“dumpLogsDatabase” from the OnePlus One A0001 device contained very detailed information 
on the location requests, accuracy figures, and location coordinates. An example entry is shown 
below, having been copied from the SQLite database record into Excel for easier viewing: 
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{"locationInfo":{"epochTime":1444228846496 
"dateTime":"Oct 7 2015 10:40:46 AM" 
"data":{"locDB":{"timestamp":1444228823366 
"provider":"fused" 
"lat":27.9778361 
"lon":-82.5132756 
"accuracy":43.5 
"alt":0 
"age":"23129"} 
"locNew":{"timestamp":1444228846236 
"provider":"fused" 
"lat":27.9778371 
"lon":-82.5132754 
"accuracy":36 
"alt":0 
"age":"259"} 
"geolocation_meta":{"emode":"storeLoc" 
"info":"DB: New loc with higher accuracy. Replacing loc in database"} 
"device":{"battery":"82" 
"charge":"1" 
"wifi_state":"1" 
"build":"10827"}}}} 
Figure 19 - Sample entry from "dumpLogsDatabase" file 
 Aside from the actual latitude and longitude values, this database was also caching the 
accuracy information, WLAN (“wifi”) state, altitude (“alt”), and battery status. Other entries 
detail the location request type, such as “PRIORITY_BALANCED_POWER_ACCURACY,” as 
well as cell tower connectivity, with one example reading "info":"New cell tower location 
detected. Notifying policies." This level of detail is certainly illuminating, especially since this 
log had such high granularity, sometimes recording multiple updates for a single second! Of 
course, the extreme detail of this particular log did have a significant tradeoff: it only covered the 
most recent day’s activity. Still, for one session running approximately 128 minutes, this log had 
over 3000 entries! A small window, surely, but it is a very detailed one. 
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 Another database associated with one of the ad-supported free games, QuizUp’s 
“mixpanel” database, as recovered from the Galaxy S5 test device, stored some information on 
the WLAN connectivity history, but it was embedded in lengthy text records and was limited in 
both quantity and scope. The information was timestamped, but the timestamps only pertained to 
sessions in which this game was actually in use. Furthermore, the entries reflect the wireless 
network connectivity state, not necessarily whether the WLAN sensor was active. As seen in the 
figure below, these entries show “$wifi:false” even though the WLAN services were enabled at 
the specified timestamps appearing toward the right side of each entry, based on test session 
documentation. However, the device was not connected to a network at the time, so the reported 
“false” status is consistent with the connectivity state. 
 
Figure 20 - Contents of the QuizUp game's "mixpanel" database showing WLAN network state 
with timestamp 
The Amazon shopping app’s “event” database recovered from the LG VS870 device, 
covered a much broader range of dates and times, and tags events with a plain-text 
“connectionType:” parameter, listing either “WIFI” or “mobile” for each entry. This database 
was reviewed to determine if the connection types reported were consistent with those noted in 
the test session documentation. In most cases, the recorded connection types matched the active 
services noted in the test session documentation. The exceptions again included sessions in 
which the WLAN sensor was enabled but the device was not actually connected to a network. 
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Exceptions are noted in the following table, which contains formatted samples of the data 
retrieved from the database to facilitate review of the information. Actual data pulled from the 
database is shown in the green columns, while author-added columns are presented in gray. 
Table 14 - Examples of connection types logged in the Amazon app's "event" database that are 
not consistent with test session documentation 
Connection Type Timestamp Converted 
Timestamp 
(UTC) 
Indoor/ 
Outdoor 
Reason for discrepancy 
connectionType:"mobile" 1433634088961 
6/6/2015 
23:41:28 Outdoor 
On but not connected to 
network 
connectionType:"mobile" 1436961354568 
7/15/2015 
11:55:54 Indoor 
On but not connected yet, 
immediately subsequent 
entries show connection 
connectionType:"mobile" 1436972419082 
7/15/2015 
15:00:19 Outdoor Driving 
connectionType:"mobile" 1436974483466 
7/15/2015 
15:34:43 Outdoor 
On but out of range of 
network access point 
connectionType:"mobile" 1437147300840 
7/17/2015 
15:35:00 Outdoor Driving 
connectionType:"mobile" 1442675854508 
9/19/2015 
15:17:34 Outdoor Driving 
connectionType:"mobile" 1442706821217 
9/19/2015 
23:53:41 Outdoor 
On but not connected to 
network 
 
 One more log file of possible interest was recovered from both of the non-Lollipop 
devices (the LG VS870 and Galaxy S4 Mini) and was stored in the Google Mobile Services 
directory. This database, titled “herrevad,” appears to track connections to saved WLAN 
networks, including SSID and BSSID (MAC address) info, as well as timestamps. This content 
could be valuable in placing a particular device within range of a known access point at a 
specific time. However, during a review of the databases’ contents, it became clear that the 
database did not capture all of the instances in which the devices were connected to WLAN 
networks, based on test session activity. However, for those instances it did report connectivity, 
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the information was consistent with test session documentation. An excerpt of the database 
content appears in the table below, with author-added content in gray. 
Table 15 - Excerpt of the Google Mobile Services' "herrevad" database showing WLAN network 
connection details 
ssid security_type bssid timestamp_millis Converted 
timestamp (UTC) 
COYG 4 20:aa:4b:32:21:3c 1436961710670 7/15/2015 12:01:50 
COYG 4 20:aa:4b:32:21:3c 1436961823419 7/15/2015 12:03:43 
COYG 4 20:aa:4b:32:21:3c 1436961964698 7/15/2015 12:06:04 
COYG 4 20:aa:4b:32:21:3c 1436962208837 7/15/2015 12:10:08 
COYG 4 20:aa:4b:32:21:3c 1436962385574 7/15/2015 12:13:05 
COYG 4 20:aa:4b:32:21:3c 1436964198663 7/15/2015 12:43:18 
COYG 4 20:aa:4b:32:21:3c 1436964362487 7/15/2015 12:46:02 
   
From these examinations, it seems clear that connectivity-related log artifacts may be 
quite useful in ruling out the possibility that the WLAN sensor was disabled at a particular time. 
However, it may be more difficult to affirm that the sensor was indeed enabled at a particular 
time, since these logs seem to only document when the device is actually connected to a network. 
A device may have the WLAN functionality enabled but be out of range or not connected due to 
wireless network security, for example. In situations like these, it seems the log files would not 
indicate that the device WLAN feature was active, since the device would then default to cellular 
data services.  
Knowing this, and knowing that the Waze app requires “High Accuracy” mode to be 
enabled for navigation functionality, it could be helpful to know when the Waze app is in use. 
Fortunately, one database recovered from the Galaxy S4 Mini test device seems to do just that. 
This database, titled “ContextLog_0.db,” tracks app usage in one of its tables, including start and 
stop times, as well as duration and activity type. It seems to be specific to Samsung devices, 
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located within the “/Root/data/com.samsung.android.providers.context/databases/” directory. 
Figure 21 below shows an excerpt of this database, filtered to show the Waze app’s activity on a 
particular test date.  
 
Figure 21 - Content of the "ContextLog_0.db" database, filtered to show Waze app activity 
The Waze “NavigateActivity” entries are particularly interesting, knowing that the Waze 
app requires all sensors to be enabled to perform the navigation function. Because the duration of 
this activity is also reported, it could be of value in evaluating not just Waze application data 
reliability, but also the potential accuracy of any location artifacts cached by other applications 
during the same timeframe. 
If another app had cached location data for a particular time, or if an investigator had 
obtained a timestamped location from either cellular service providers or the cloud resources 
previously discussed, a review of such metadata cached by seemingly unrelated apps could 
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provide insight into the reliability of the location artifact, even if the information pertains just to 
WLAN services. This would especially apply if the accuracy trends outlined in the literature 
review section hold true. The next section addresses the evaluated accuracy of the location data 
recovered in this study. 
  
Accuracy Evaluation 
 Large and disparate quantities of location artifacts were recovered from the various test 
devices. As previously reviewed, the location data is stored in varying formats and intervals. To 
evaluate the reliability of the device location services, the recovered geo-tagged photos were 
examined and compared to the actual locations documented both via the photos themselves and 
the test session documentation. Additional examinations of the recovered cloud data were 
performed to investigate its reliability, as well. From these reviews, a number of general trends 
were noted. 
Geo-Tagged Photos 
 As previously discussed, only two of the four test devices were found to store any geo-
tagged photos, despite all devices being configured to geo-tag camera images and being used in 
test sessions involving captured photos. Analysis of the geo-tagged photos from the LG VS870 
and the OnePlus One A0001 test phones was performed to determine if any accuracy 
determinations could be made. Each photograph’s embedded latitude and longitude values were 
compared to the known location as captured in the image and noted in the test session 
documentation, using an online distance calculator tool. A secondary tool was then used to verify 
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the calculated distance. The figure below shows an example coordinate from one A0001 geo-
tagged photo and its corresponding actual location, with the error distance displayed, as well. 
 
Figure 22 - Geo-tagged photo example latitude and longitude accuracy check 
 Via this method, each coordinate recovered from the test devices’ geo-tagged photos was 
evaluated for accuracy and an average value was calculated for the various test sessions. Test 
session environmental and sensor parameters were also examined, with the results for each 
device documented in the tables below. Fifty-eight photos from the A0001 and sixteen photos 
from the VS870 were evaluated. 
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Table 16 - LG VS870 geo-tagged photos, average accuracy 
Device Date 
Number 
of Photos Environment 
Indoor/ 
Outdoor Cell/WLAN/GNSS 
Average 
Accuracy (m) 
VS870 9-Jun 3 Suburban Outdoor Cell 130 
VS870 16-Sep 2 Suburban Indoor Cell+WLAN 29.5 
VS870 19-Sep 3 Urban Outdoor Cell+WLAN 67.3 
VS870 15-Jul 3 Rural Outdoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 19.7 
VS870 6-Jun 2 Suburban Outdoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 28.5 
VS870 15-Jul 3 Rural Indoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 30.3 
 
Table 17 - OnePlus One A0001 geo-tagged photos, average accuracy 
Device Date 
Number 
of Photos Environment 
Indoor 
/Outdoor Cell/WLAN/GNSS 
Average 
Accuracy (m) 
A0001 14-Jul 3 Suburban Indoor Cell 24 
A0001 9-Jun 3 Suburban Outdoor Cell 1373.3 
A0001 6-Jun 3 Suburban Outdoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 3.7 
A0001 8-Sep 6 Suburban Indoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 3.7 
A0001 15-Jul 3 Rural Outdoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 4.3 
A0001 19-Jul 3 Rural Outdoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 5.7 
A0001 6-Sep 3 Suburban Indoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 10.7 
A0001 6-Aug 25 Suburban Outdoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 10.9 
A0001 19-Jul 1 Rural Indoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 15 
A0001 15-Jul 3 Rural Indoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 16 
A0001 27-May 5 Suburban Indoor Cell+WLAN+GNSS 118 
 
 The results seem to support the notion that cellular-only derived locations are less reliable 
than those in which the GNSS resources are active. Results from the two test sessions for which 
geo-tagged photos were captured when only cellular and WLAN sensors were active also seem 
to corroborate the notion that location data reliability does not suffer from a device’s use indoors. 
Indeed, these results seem to indicate that the location data may be more accurate when WLAN 
services are used indoors, but due to the small sample size, more testing would likely be needed 
to determine if this observation can be applied generally. 
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Cloud Data Limitations 
 Two preliminary issues present potential obstacles to the utility of the Google Location 
History cloud data. The first involves the user’s choice to utilize Google’s location services. A 
user may opt not to do so, though this option could severely limit the device’s functionality in the 
conventional sense of how consumers utilize their smartphones. For example, a user would not 
be able to utilize the Google Maps app. In short, most users likely do choose to use Google’s 
location services, making this particular issue probably less significant. The “googlesettings.db” 
database appears to store a record indicating whether a user has opted to allow Google’s services 
access to the device location, as shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 23- Content of the "googlesettings.db" database 
 The “use_location_for_services” option is set to “1,” indicating that the feature is 
enabled. This should indicate that Google Location History should be stored on Google’s servers 
and therefore be retrievable using the Cloud Analyzer software or legal process to Google. 
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However, this database was located in the Google Services Framework directory 
(“/Root/data/com.google.android.gsf/databases/”) as recovered from two of the test devices. This 
is not a coincidence, as these were the two non-Lollipop devices. This brings up the second 
fundamental issue. 
 In the newer versions of Android, as previously discussed, many of the core Google 
application data is excluded from the ADB backup process. This not only includes the database 
that indicates whether a user’s location history may be recoverable using the Cloud Analyzer 
software, but it also extends to a key resource used to generate the account package file 
containing the necessary credentials to obtain the information: the “accounts.db” database. This 
database stores the Google account information, with the login email address and an encrypted 
form of the password, as shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 24 - Content of the "accounts.db" database 
 This database is stored under the “/Root/system/users/” directory, which evidently is also 
excluded from the ADB backup process, as it was not recovered for either of the Lollipop 
devices for which physical extraction was not supported. Without this file, the account package 
file cannot be created, meaning credentials will have to be manually entered in the Cloud 
Analyzer extraction process. Of course, this would require the examiner to know the user’s 
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credentials or obtain them somehow. Furthermore, the manual entry of credentials does prompt 
the notification email to the user that a new login from an unrecognized device has occurred. 
Without a non-disclosure order of some kind, investigators risk alerting a suspect of their 
activity, even if they are fortunate enough to have obtained the credentials somehow. Still worse, 
if investigators cannot gain root access, obtain a physical extraction of the device data, or 
ascertain the Google account credentials, they may not be able to retrieve the cloud data at all.  
 However, even presuming that the extraction of the cloud data is successful, another 
limitation of its utility presents itself. This stems from the relatively less precise nature of the 
retrieved coordinates. As described before, the Google Location History data extracted via the 
Cloud Analyzer software appears restricted to a precision level of one thousandth of a degree. 
This means the coordinates should be roughly within 100 meters of the actual device location. 
Contrast this level of reliability with that obtained via the various apps reviewed, many of which 
were caching coordinates on the order of millionths-level precision or better, and that makes the 
Google Location History seem more of a general outline than a specific track. Note the higher 
frequency and precision of the RunKeeper app’s cached data for the same timeframe as shown in 
the figure below. 
78 
 
 
 
Figure 25 - Cloud Analyzer (left) and RunKeeper (right) location data for same timeframe 
 Curiously, this same discrepancy in precision seems also to extend to the Google location 
data obtained by downloading a .kml file via the Google account web interface. This involves 
logging into the Google user account and selecting the “Control My Content” option from the 
menu, then navigating to the “Manage Activity” option for the “Places you go” category, as 
shown in the figure below. Notably, users can also opt to delete content via this utility, as well. 
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Figure 26 - Google user account interface content management 
 From there, a user may view their Google location history for a specified day, or they 
may opt to download or delete the content. Presumably, any such downloaded content would 
resemble the corresponding timeframe’s data obtained via the Cloud Analyzer software for the 
same device/user. To test this notion, the content for the date referenced in Figure 25 above was 
saved to a .kml file, as shown below. 
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Figure 27 - Option to save timeframe as KML file via Google user account web interface 
 Once this data was downloaded, it was mapped along with the corresponding data from 
the RunKeeper app and the Cloud Analyzer locations. Curiously, the data downloaded directly 
from Google’s user account interface appears far more precise than the associated Cloud 
Analyzer data. So the initial assumption that the Cloud Analyzer data’s precision level was due 
to a limitation imposed by Google appears to be incorrect. Google’s servers appear to be storing 
much more precise information. Additional testing or inquiry would be needed to determine if 
this is a limitation inherent to the Cloud Analyzer software, or some other reason. Figure 28 
displays the map comparing the RunKeeper, Google account KML file, and Cloud Analyzer data 
for the same timeframe. 
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Figure 28 - Comparison of cached coordinates for same timeframe from RunKeeper (purple), 
Google user location history (yellow), and Cloud Analyzer (cyan) 
 A number of clear observations can be made from this map. First, the Google user 
account location history is clearly more precise than the Cloud Analyzer data obtained, even 
though the Cloud Analyzer theoretically should be accessing and retrieving the very same 
Google account data. Furthermore, the Google user data appears to correspond more closely to 
the RunKeeper app’s data, with the Cloud Analyzer data forming broad geometric patterns 
surrounding the more detailed tracks presented by the other sources. Given that the more 
accurate location is likely to be the more precise one, it seems that the Cloud Analyzer data may 
be limited to the 100 meter range imposed by its thousandths-level precision. Still, this level of 
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accuracy will certainly be enough in many cases, and the high update interval would still be 
useful in establishing patterns of movement or dwelling.  
 At a minimum, the Cloud Analyzer software offers another tool to investigators for 
corroborating data or testimony from other sources. It is very dense, timewise, voluminous, and 
it is clearly accurate enough to place an individual device within a block or so of a particular 
location, at worst. Witness statements, suspect alibis, call detail records, or other resources could 
all be better evaluated with this information. Given that the majority of Android users likely 
utilize the Google location services that render this software’s function possible, it seems that the 
cloud data resource could become a potential boon for investigators in criminal cases, provided 
they are able to extract the necessary data to access the content or otherwise obtain the user’s 
credentials. 
 
General Trends 
 To evaluate the accuracy of the location data, content from both the information 
recovered from the device and the Google Location History cloud data were reviewed for 
coordinates with corresponding timestamps, then compared to actual locations documented in 
test session records. Overall, the results seemed to support the previously stated trends involving 
accuracy based on resource type. For example, locations obtained when only cellular service was 
active were significantly less accurate than the same location information recorded in the same 
place at approximately the same time when all sensors were active, as illustrated in Figures 29 
and 30 below. 
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Figure 29 - Actual versus Cloud location with cellular service only (error of over 1.5 kilometers) 
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Figure 30 - Actual, Device, & Cloud locations with all sensors active (errors from 5 to 45 
meters) 
 These figures depict how significant the impact of sensor activity can be. With all of the 
sensors active, the error margin was reduced from over a kilometer down to a few meters for the 
device cached information, a little more for the corresponding cloud location. Interestingly, the 
cloud data point was not quite as accurate as what the device cached, even though all services 
were active. This could very well be the result of the cloud data’s limitation to thousandths-level 
precision. Figure 31 again illustrates the way in which cloud points, even with high frequency 
and volume of locations, are hampered by the lower precision. The device is caching coordinates 
on the order of ten-thousandths in the Map My Walk app’s “workout.db” database, and just that 
extra power of ten clearly shows a much more refined track of the actual device location. 
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Figure 31 - Map My Walk device (green) versus cloud (red) locations 
 The cloud track clearly is more angular and less precise, but it does capture the basic 
outline of the movement, with errors generally in the 20 to 50 meter range. In another instance, 
when only cellular and WLAN sensors were active, the error was in the over a kilometer range. 
Figures 32 and 33 demonstrate how much of an impact activating the GNSS services had for the 
particular area in question (traversed during a drive along the junction of Interstates 10 and 75, 
and back again). In Figure 32, the error reaches up to about 1.5 kilometers without the GNSS 
services. However, with the GNSS sensor enabled, the max error appears to go down to roughly 
300 meters, though it is generally much less than that, as shown in Figure 33. 
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Figure 32 - Location Tracker device data (yellow) versus cloud data (magenta) - no GNSS 
 
Figure 33 - Location Tracker device data (purple) versus cloud data (green) - with GNSS 
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 The above figures demonstrate the relative accuracies in suburban and rural 
environments, with and without GNSS services enabled. In general, there was no notable cost to 
accuracy of cached device data when GNSS services were enabled, regardless of whether the 
surrounding were rural or suburban, and very little cost noted for indoor use. In urban areas, 
there did appear to be relatively little tradeoff for disabling GNSS services, perhaps due to the 
higher density of cell towers and WLAN access points, as well as the possible interference with 
GNSS signals due to concentrations of tall buildings. Figures 34 and 35 show some examples of 
the location data obtained from testing in an urban environment with GNSS disabled and 
enabled, respectively. 
 
Figure 34 - Device versus actual versus cloud locations in urban environment without GNSS 
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Figure 35 - Device (purple) versus cloud (green) locations in urban environment with GNSS 
 The purple route in Figure 35 reflects the more accurate route based on the test session 
activity and was cached on the device by the Run Keeper app. There certainly is some 
improvement over the relative locations displayed in Figure 34, in which only cellular and 
WLAN services were enabled, at least for the device data. The cloud data is clearly less precise 
and curiously less frequently updated (roughly every three minutes) for this particular timeframe. 
The relatively less accurate cloud data for this instance could again be attributed to the 
thousandths-level precision that characterizes it. Furthermore, the device was in transit in this 
test session, and in similar sessions involving transit, the cloud locations also displayed a small 
time lag.  
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 Efforts to evaluate the reliability of recovered location data using the cached accuracy 
metadata focused on applications that reported their accuracy in real time via the user interface 
during test sessions. These accuracy estimates were noted in the test session documentation and 
later compared to the cached accuracy values. In the user interface, the accuracy values were 
reported in feet. No units are specified in the accuracy metadata recovered from device SQLite 
databases for the apps in question, namely Life360 and Locate My Friends, but numerically, they 
were roughly in line with those reported via the user interface. These locations were plotted on 
maps along with cloud location points with similar timestamps, then compared to documented 
test session locations. In general, the calculated error values noted in the maps seemed as though 
they’d be more consistent with device and user interface values if the reported error were 
measured in meters rather than feet.  
 Overall, however, the general trends in terms of a hierarchy of source accuracy seemed to 
hold true, with GNSS-enabled sessions recording the most accurate data. In some instances, 
individual location points appeared to be within just a few feet of the actual test location. This 
was especially true when GNSS services were enabled, but was also noted a few times when 
cellular and WLAN services were running without GNSS. The maximum error range noted in 
this study was still less than two kilometers off, and it was noted in test sessions involving only 
cellular service and in less populated areas. Thus, even in the worst case scenarios of this study’s 
conditions, both cloud and device-cached location data proved reliable enough to place a device 
within a city, at the very least, and possibly into specific buildings, under ideal circumstances. As 
both cell tower and WLAN access point infrastructure expands and increases in concentration 
accordingly, it seems only likely that mobile device location data will become even more precise. 
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Location Data Recovery and Evaluation Strategy 
 First, if an examiner has access to the various paid, specialized mobile device forensics 
tools, a good deal of location of artifacts will be parsed automatically, including geo-tagged 
photos, Google Maps searches, Waze recent destinations, and coordinates from various 
messaging apps like Facebook or WhatsApp. If not, these are relatively easy to identify via the 
use of free metadata parsers, in the case of geo-tagged media files, or SQLite database viewers, 
for the various navigation and chat apps mentioned. 
 From there, Internet Explorer can be used to examine the “packages.xml” file, using a 
simple “find” search for “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION” and 
“ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION” to identify applications with location permissions and the 
directory paths in which their data is cached. The examiner may then target these directories for 
further review, especially SQLite databases and XML configuration files. SQLite databases may 
contain detailed caches of latitude and longitude coordinates, with metadata, and they may also 
contain embedded images like map tiles.  
It is also important to remember that some SQLite databases may store content of value 
in BLOB data, which may be less intuitive to examine. Google Maps’ “gmm_storage.db” 
database is a prime example, storing search terms and possible navigation history amongst other 
proprietary content in BLOB data records. Keyword searches are appropriate for analyzing this 
file, if an examiner is attempting to recover evidence regarding a particular location. 
Alternatively, a very primitive approach could begin with using the Strings command-line tool to 
output string content from the database to a text file, then filter the data in Excel to display 
content beginning with “/dir/” to identify searches for directions with latitude and longitude of 
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the position from which the search initiated, as well as the latitude and longitude of the searched 
destination. Figure 36 shows some of the content recovered in this way from one test device’s 
“gmm_storage.db” database.  
 
Figure 36 - Google Maps directions artifacts recovered via Strings command utility from 
"gmm_storage.db" database 
It’s also important to note that embedded toward the end of these entries is a UNIX epoch 
timestamp. Figure 37 shows this timestamp highlighted for record number 5236, which when 
converted to readable time using DCode is: Saturday, 27 June 2015 at 22:40:00. UTC. A review 
of test session documentation confirms that a Google Maps search was indeed performed using 
the test device from which this database was recovered. Curiously, the timestamp converts to a 
UTC value which should be four hours ahead of local time for the test location timezone, but the 
converted timestamp is actually consistent with the actual local time at the time of the Google 
Maps search. Incidentally, the source latitude and longitude from which the search was executed 
appear at the beginning of the record and are extremely accurate based on the test session 
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documentation. The corresponding cloud location for the same time was also quite accurate, with 
all sensors active and the device located outdoors in an urban environment. 
 
Figure 37 - Timestamp from Google Maps "gmm_storage.db" database directions search record 
This is just one example of how examiners need to remain open to digging deeper than 
what the paid forensic tools automatically parse, in their efforts to recover Android location data. 
Beginning with SQLite databases and XML configuration files associated with known location-
accessing apps, examiners should perhaps worry less about reconstructing the particular activity 
or resources associated with recovered location information and more about the details of the app 
they have recovered the data from. 
For example, based on this study’s results, it would seem that location sharing and fitness 
apps cache extremely precise and reliable data, typically. Furthermore, navigation apps, which 
are designed for safety reasons to provide a very accurate idea of the user’s location, store very 
reliable information, though perhaps with less extensive local caching. This makes sense, since 
users of fitness apps may want to review old workout routes and times to track their progress, but 
users of navigation apps are more likely to search their current destination of choice each 
session. Furthermore, if an app has only coarse location permissions, it may not be the most 
reliable of sources of location data, though certainly still good enough to refute an individual’s 
argument that they were in another town at the time, for example. Weather apps and ad-
supported games can fall into this latter category. 
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In cases where investigators are particularly determined to use device location data to 
pinpoint a user’s whereabouts, it could be helpful to check for files that may contain 
timestamped logs of network connectivity or sensor states, even though these logs could be 
associated with other apps that stored no location information. Keyword searches will do little to 
directly recover latitude and longitude coordinates, but searching for terms like “latitude REAL” 
or “lat DOUBLE” may help identify active or deleted SQLite database content that may be of 
value. Databases and unallocated space can be carved for geo-tagged pictures or map tile images, 
as well, though attributing context to these can be difficult, as it is hard to say if they reflect a 
device’s actual location or just a browsing session or location search.  
Also, if an examiner has a particular artifact of interest recovered from a known 
application, he or she could utilize a test device, install the application of interest, and run some 
tests to try to evaluate that app’s reliability in terms of location accuracy. From this study, it was 
noted that some apps will not perform their designated function unless all location resources are 
enabled, like Waze navigation, for example. Furthermore, some apps actually inform the user 
during the use of accuracy estimates, as noted for Life360 and Friend Locator. Table 18 
summarizes some location data recovery and evaluation strategies utilized in this study. 
Table 18 - Recovery and evaluation strategies 
Tier 1 – The obvious Tier 2 – Dig deeper Tier 3 – Beyond the deep end 
Forensic tools’ parsed 
artifacts 
 
SQLite databases 
 
Geo-tagged media files 
 
Map Tiles 
Identify apps with location 
permissions 
 
Examine SQLite databases 
and XML configuration files 
associated with these apps 
 
Carve for images, SQLite 
databases 
 
Keyword searches for possible 
metadata/code terms 
 
Test device analysis on app of 
interest   
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 Finally, examiners may wish to think beyond the device itself. Using call detail records 
and cloud resources may allow for the corroboration of points recovered from the device, as well 
as an expansion of the location data set. Although the data obtained via Cloud Analyzer was less 
precise, it has a number of advantages. First, the user does not need to initiate any process for the 
Google location service to begin collecting device location information, beyond agreeing to use 
Google’s location services. So the process occurs in the background, virtually all of the time, 
unlike most apps that cache location data which require a user to initiate a session or event. 
Furthermore, the coordinates are updated almost every minute or so, so the information is very 
dense and can indicate dwelling or travel, etc. Finally, because it is a background service, it is 
unlikely a user could or would disable it, leading to potentially large volumes of location data 
during timeframes when the device might otherwise not cache any.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 This research was performed with some fundamental limitations. First, it obviously 
utilized a small sample size of just four unrooted test devices, and the device and application 
settings were optimized for location caching, which may not be typical configurations. Second, 
the number and variety of test sessions clearly cannot account for all possible conditions in 
which devices are used. Testing was mostly performed in suburban (residential) areas, with 
access to rural and urban areas less frequent. Finally, devices were obviously accessible and in 
an unlocked state, mitigating the potential hurdles to data extraction one might encounter in 
forensic casework. This study does not address means of gaining access to locked devices or 
encrypted data.  
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 Based on the emerging trends noted, these last issues could become serious impediments 
to data recovery from Android devices. It remains to be seen how encryption will impact 
Android forensics in the future. Furthermore, the shift to cloud storage definitely warrants future 
study. Investigators and legal professionals need to be aware of these potential resources. Google 
Location History, for example, could be used to refute or confirm an individual’s alibi, especially 
if there is corroborating evidence showing the individual was in possession of the device at the 
time of the incident. However, confusion about legal issues of jurisdiction and authority 
surrounding the retrieval of this data certainly suggest that the criminal justice community will 
need to continue learning about the technical and logistical details involved in the process.  
Additional research into the Cloud Analyzer’s thousandths place precision level and its 
relationship to the Google user account location history could also be interesting and beneficial. 
Furthermore, one could investigate how long Google location history is maintained and if any 
data can be retrieved using the Cloud Analyzer software after a user opts to delete it via the 
Google account interface. It may also be of interest to further study the cloud data to determine if 
the trend of no cloud data points being collected when cellular service is inactive holds true, 
including whether or not airplane mode impacts this. 
Perhaps some evolution in both investigative strategies and legal statutes is needed. 
Certainly, this issue will only become more prominent as providers continue to emphasize 
security and move toward cloud-based data storage. It would also be a very useful study to 
develop a method for automating some of the techniques outlined in this paper. The volume and 
complexity of data cached on these devices means manual review and correlation is tedious and 
time-consuming. Finally, because there are now varied resources, from the carrier records to the 
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device data to the cloud information, investigators should consider exploring all of these avenues 
in their cases. An automated solution capable of incorporating all of these different resources and 
streamlining their review would be a very valuable tool indeed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 Smartphones and tablets are becoming more and more entrenched in everyday life, and 
users knowingly and unknowingly store intimate information within these devices. Because of 
the location aware features offered by mobile devices, as well as users’ tendency to keep them on 
their person much of the time, device location history is both a real phenomenon and a 
potentially valuable resource in criminal investigations. Android devices make up a majority of 
the mobile market share, and this study’s exploration of their capabilities, strategies, and stored 
data indicates that they do indeed possess large amounts of historical location data associated 
with a particular device, and by extension, its owner.  
 One critical point to consider is that mobile device investigations now go beyond the 
phone itself, extending not just to carrier records but also to potential cloud artifacts. As this 
study demonstrated, vast quantities of Android device location points are archived on Google’s 
servers. This information is updated often enough to demonstrate if a user is dwelling or 
traveling, and to provide an estimate of their location likely accurate to within 100 meters, or 
less. Furthermore, what really sets this resource apart is its omnipresent activity, running in the 
background without any need for user-initiated sessions or events. Potential impediments to the 
acquisition and use of the cloud resource include issues involving access or credentials, as well 
as perceived ambiguity regarding the legality of obtaining the cloud data via a commercial tool, 
such as CelleBrite’s Cloud Analyzer software. 
 In terms of the devices themselves, examiners should begin by examining data associated 
with applications known to have permissions to the device location. Text-based files may be 
triaged via keyword searching, and this technique may also extend to SQLite database column 
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headers, though not floating point values, which is typically how latitude and longitude 
coordinates are stored within the databases. Databases should be reviewed for location artifacts. 
This study describes a number of example databases and their content. Depending on the type of 
application, the cached location points could reflect the device’s actual location, or some 
searched point of interest or destination. In other words, a device’s location at a particular time 
may be either directly documented, or it may be inferred based on a viewed point of interest 
nearby, or a navigation route with transcribed directions.  
 Different types of apps seemed to handle location data differently, with almost all 
requiring some sort of user-initiated impetus to record the information. Fitness, location sharing, 
and chat apps appear to store device locations with high precision. In general, these apps also 
seem to require GNSS sensors to be enabled, although perhaps less so for the location sharing 
apps. The update intervals are tied to the user activity. When a user employs a fitness app, the 
device location may be updated up to every few seconds, as opposed to a chat app in which the 
location is recorded only when a message is sent, with the proper settings configured to enable 
location sharing.  
 Navigation and leisure apps also require user interaction, but these apps may store 
locations more likely to be searched or viewed by the user, not necessarily the location of the 
device itself. The cached locations do appear to be quite precise, but update intervals are again 
tied to the user’s activity. In the case of leisure apps, and the Waze navigation app’s transcribed 
turn-by-turn directions, the device’s location could possibly be inferred from these apps’ data. 
Weather apps and ad-supported games did cache some location artifacts but were not as reliable 
in terms of accuracy, and the update intervals were intermittent. 
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 It may also benefit an examiner to look further than the files or apps that may store 
location data itself. Various log files may offer additional information regarding sensor activity 
that could prove valuable in evaluating the accuracy of any other recovered device locations. 
While GNSS sensor activity logs were lacking in this research, WLAN connectivity was 
documented by several apps in several different contexts. Other log files monitored app usage, 
which could be of interest when dealing with an app that requires GNSS operations to perform 
particular functions or cache data. For example, if a coordinate pair of interest is found in an 
examination, and then details from such a seemingly unrelated log files regarding app usage 
reveal that a separate app, which requires GNSS services, was active at the time, it may bolster 
confidence in the reliability or accuracy of the particular point. 
 Previous studies regarding accuracy trends noted during live tracking of test devices 
noted that reliability improved whenever GNSS resources are used, with location points derived 
merely from cell tower signals proving least accurate. Somewhere in between either extreme, 
WLAN-supplemented services were reported as having decent accuracy of within 100 meters or 
so. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these trends were corroborated in this study by the location data 
recovered from the mobile devices themselves. The maximum error in this testing was roughly 
around 1.5 kilometers, with a minimum error of within 3 meters noted. The maximum error was 
in fact obtained when only cellular services were active, and in a rural area. The minimum, 
however, was associated with a test session in which cellular, WLAN, and GNSS sensors were 
all active, and in a suburban area. 
 Such an accuracy range is likely adequate for refuting an alibi, but investigators may 
wish to have a better idea of how accurate a particular cached coordinate pair may be. 
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Fortunately, multiple resources exist to facilitate such an effort, in the form of metadata and logs 
stored on the devices themselves, to the option to review carrier records and cloud data as 
corroborative sources. Examiners should not rely solely on commercial tools to parse location 
data for them. They should actively search application data for possible contemporaneous 
artifacts that may provide insight or verify a particular point, focusing especially on databases 
and text files. The search should initially focus on apps with location permissions, but one should 
not overlook the potentially valuable logging contributions of the other app types. 
 These strategies, along with the incorporation of external resources such as carrier 
records and cloud data, may enable an examiner to be able to do more than just recover the 
location artifacts, but also comment on their potential reliability as well. As device storage and 
extraction techniques evolve, and cloud storage becomes more prominent, mobile device 
forensic examinations will need to evolve, as well. Understanding the device functionality and 
all of the possible resources available will help ensure that practitioners perform the most 
effective and complete analyses they can, improving investigations and promoting informed 
adjudication of civil investigations or criminal cases. 
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APPENDIX A: TEST SESSION WORKSHEET 
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APPENDIX B: APPS AND SETTINGS INFORMATION 
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Table 19 - Apps and Settings Information 
Category Apps Tested Custom Location Settings Location Permissions 
Navigation Google Maps 
Waze 
Google Location Settings enabled 
No track log settings noted 
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
Fitness RunKeeper 
Map My Walk 
My Tracks 
Linked to Facebook account 
Linked to Facebook account 
Set recording time interval to 
smallest option 
Recording distance interval set to 
32 feet 
Default track name set to Date 
and Location 
☐ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
 
Location 
Sharing 
Glympse 
 
Life360 
Locate My Friends 
Swarm 
No logging options noted 
Linked to Facebook 
Location sharing enabled 
Location sharing enabled 
Linked to Facebook 
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
 
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
Chat Facebook Messenger 
WhatsApp 
Viber 
LINE 
Messages include location 
No location options noted 
No location options noted 
No location options noted 
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
Weather AccuWeather 
 
One Weather 
GO Weather 
Weather Bug 
Enabled alerts, Use current 
location 
“Follow my location” enabled 
Use current location 
“Enable my location” checked 
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
 
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
Ad-
Supported 
Games 
Words With Friends 
Trivia Crack 
Quiz Up 
Linked to Facebook 
Linked to Facebook 
Linked to Facebook 
☐ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☐ Fine  
☐ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
Leisure Yelp 
Foursquare 
Field Trip 
No location options noted 
Location services enabled 
No location options noted 
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
Other 
  
*(OnePlus 
One A0001 
only) 
Location Tracker 
 
 
 
GPS Status Tracker 
Time interval set to smallest 
(every 5 minutes) 
Location resource options: 
Mobile/WLAN, GPS, or Both 
NMEA logging enabled 
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
 
 
 
☒ Coarse  ☒ Fine  
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Table 20 - Test Session Information 
Date  Device(s) Used Environment Setting Category Active Sensors 
May 27 OnePlus One 
LG VS870 
☒ Indoor 
☐ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
June 6 OnePlus One 
LG VS870 
☐ Indoor 
☐ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
June 9 OnePlus One 
LG VS870 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☐ GNSS 
☐ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
June 13 SM-G900P S5 ☒ Indoor 
☐ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☐ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
June 14 SM-G900P S5 
SGH-i257 S4 
Mini 
☒ Indoor 
☐ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
June 19 SGH-i257 S4 
Mini 
 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
June 27 SGH-i257 S4 
Mini 
SM-G900P S5 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☐ Suburban 
☒ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
July 14 OnePlus One 
LG VS870 
☒ Indoor 
☐ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☐ GNSS 
☐ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
July 15 OnePlus One 
LG VS870 
☒ Indoor 
☐ Outdoor 
☒ Rural 
☐ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
July 15 OnePlus One 
LG VS870 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☒ Rural 
☐ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
July 17 OnePlus One 
LG VS870 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☒ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
July 19 OnePlus One 
 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
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Date  Device(s) Used Environment Setting Category Active Sensors 
August 6 OnePlus One 
SM-G900P S5 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☒ Rural 
☐ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
September 6 OnePlus One 
 
☒ Indoor 
☐ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
September 8 OnePlus One 
 
☒ Indoor 
☐ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
September 16 OnePlus One 
LG VS870 
☒ Indoor 
☐ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☐ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
September 16 SGH-i257 S4 
Mini 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS* 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
September 18 OnePlus One 
SM-G900P S5 
☒ Indoor 
☐ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☐ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☐ Cellular 
September 19 LG VS870 
SGH-i257 S4 
Mini 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☒ Rural 
☐ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
September 19 LG VS870 ☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☒ Rural 
☐ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☐ GNSS 
☐ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
September 19 SGH-i257 S4 
Mini 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☐ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
September 19 LG VS870 
SGH-i257 S4 
Mini 
☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☐ Rural 
☐ Suburban 
☒ Urban 
☒ GNSS* 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
October 8 OnePlus One ☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☒ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☒ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
October 8 OnePlus One ☐ Indoor 
☒ Outdoor 
☒ Rural 
☒ Suburban 
☐ Urban 
☐ GNSS 
☒ WLAN 
☒ Cellular 
*GNSS enabled for navigation sessions only. All other test activity performed with no GNSS. 
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Table 21 - Analysis tools used in this study 
Tool (Vendor/Tool Name) Version Purpose/Usage 
CelleBrite UFED 4PC 4.2.2.86 Extraction of data from test 
devices 
CelleBrite Physical Analyzer 4.2.6.4 Analysis of data extracted from 
test devices 
CelleBrite UFED Cloud 
Analyzer 
4.3.0.412 Collection of Google Location 
History data for test devices 
Magnet Forensics  
Internet Evidence Finder 
6.6.3.0736 Analysis of data extracted from 
test devices 
Magnet Forensics ACQUIRE 0.6.0.0351 Extraction of data from test 
devices 
Kali Linux  1.0 (64-bit) Extraction of data from test 
device 
Guidance Software EnCase 7.10.05.11 Analysis of data extracted from 
test devices 
SQLite Studio 2.1.4 Analysis of databases extracted 
from test devices 
DCode  4.02a Timestamp conversion/analysis 
Microsoft Excel Pro 2013 Analysis of databases and cloud 
data extracted from test devices 
Earth Point Excel to KML  2015 Conversion of Excel content to 
KML format for use in Google 
Earth 
Google Earth 7.1.5.1557 Import of recovered location 
data for creation of figures 
X-Ways Forensics 18.5 SQLite database carving, 
keyword searches 
Strings 2.51 Analysis of Google Maps 
“gmm_storage.db” database 
Coordinate Distance Calculator N/A  
(web tool) 
Web-based calculator to 
determine distance between two 
sets of latitude/longitude 
coordinates 
Movable Type Scripts – 
Calculate Distance between 
Latitude/Longitude Coordinate 
Points 
N/A  
(web tool) 
Secondary (verification) tool for 
distance between two sets of 
latitude/longitude coordinates 
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Table 22 - Suggested keywords for recovery of metadata, application code, or sensor activity 
Request Types Metadata Active Services Databases of 
Interest 
PRIORITY_BALANCED_POWER_ACCURACY 
PRIORITY_HIGH_ACCURACY 
PRIORITY_LOW_POWER 
PRIORITY_NO_POWER 
accuracy 
altitude 
elevation 
recent 
connectionType 
mobile 
WIFI 
BSSID 
SSID 
latitude REAL 
latitude 
DOUBLE 
latitude 
INTEGER 
lat REAL 
lat DOUBLE 
lat INTEGER 
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Table 23 - SQLite query details 
Database Filename Associated 
App 
Query Used 
360LocationDB Life360, 
Locate My 
Friends 
select locations.time, 
datetime((locations.time)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted 
Time (UTC)", locations.lat, locations.lon, 
locations.accuracy, locations.speed, locations.altitude, 
locations.bearing, locations.provider 
from locations 
order by locations.time asc 
dumpLogsDatabase Locate My 
Friends 
select logsTable.log, logsTable.utc, 
datetime((logsTable.utc)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted 
Time (UTC)" 
from logsTable 
order by logsTable.utc asc 
event Amazon 
preinstalled 
app 
select events.body, events.timestamp, 
datetime((events.timestamp)/1000,'unixepoch') as 
"Converted Timestamp (UTC)" 
from events 
order by events.timestamp asc 
Forecast_accu.db AccuWeather select forecasts.current_city_flag, 
forecasts.device_updated_millis, 
datetime((forecasts.device_updated_millis)/1000,'unixepoch'
) as "Converted Timestamp (UTC)", forecasts.city, 
forecasts.country, forecasts.lat, forecasts.lon 
from forecasts 
Fsq.db Foursquare, 
Swarm 
select comments.createdAT, 
datetime((comments.createdAt),'unixepoch') as "Converted 
Time (UTC)", comments.lat, comments.lng, 
comments.geoId, comments.contextLine 
from comments 
order by comments.createdAT asc 
herrevad Google 
Mobile 
Services 
select local_reports.network_type, local_reports.ssid, 
local_reports.security_type, local_reports.bssid, 
local_reports.timestamp_millis, 
datetime((local_reports.timestamp_millis)/1000,'unixepoch') 
as "Converted timestamp (UTC)" 
from local_reports 
order by local_reports.timestamp_millis asc 
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Database Filename Associated 
App 
Query Used 
Messaging.db Life360, 
Locate My 
Friends 
select message.content, thread_participant.participant_name, 
message.created_at, 
datetime((message.created_at),'unixepoch') as "Converted 
Time (UTC)", message.has_location, 
message.location_latitude, message.location_longitude, 
message.location_timestamp, 
datetime((message.location_timestamp),'unixepoch') as 
"Converted Time (UTC)", message.location_accuracy, 
message.location_address1, message.location_address2 
from message, thread_participant 
where message.sender_id=thread_participant.participant_id 
order by message.created_at asc 
Mytracks.db My Tracks select tracks.name, trackpoints.longitude, 
trackpoints.latitude, trackpoints.time, 
datetime((trackpoints.time)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted 
Time (UTC)", trackpoints.elevation, trackpoints.accuracy, 
trackpoints.speed, trackpoints.bearing, trackpoints.sensor 
from tracks, trackpoints 
where tracks._id=trackpoints.trackid 
order by trackpoints.time asc 
Oneweather.db 1 Weather select geocodes.city, geocodes.state, geocodes.country, 
geocodes.lat, geocodes.lng, geocodes.lastHit, 
datetime((geocodes.lastHit)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted 
Timestamp (UTC)", geocodes.hits 
from geocodes 
order by geocodes._id asc 
RunKeeper.sqlite RunKeeper select points.trip_id, trips.start_date, 
datetime((trips.start_date+points.time_interval_at_point*100
0)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted Time", points.latitude, 
points.longitude, points.altitude, 
points.time_interval_at_point, points.speed_from_last_point, 
points.distance_from_last_point, points.point_type, 
points.accuracy, points.distance_at_point 
from points, trips 
where points.trip_id=trips._id 
order by points._id asc 
Tts.db Waze select Jane.text, Jane.path, Jane.update_time, 
datetime((Jane.update_time),'unixepoch') as "Converted 
Time (UTC)" 
from Jane 
order by Jane.update_time asc 
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Database Filename Associated 
App 
Query Used 
User.db Waze select places.name, places.street, places.city, places.state, 
places.house, places.longitude, places.latitude, 
places.venue_id, places.created_time, 
datetime((places.created_time),'unixepoch') as "Converted 
Created Time (UTC)", recents.access_time, 
datetime((recents.access_time),'unixepoch') as "Converted 
Access Time (UTC)" 
from places, recents 
where places.id=recents.place_id 
order by places.id asc 
Viber_messages Viber select messages.date, 
datetime((messages.date)/1000,'unixepoch') as "Converted 
Time (UTC)", messages.type, messages.body, 
messages.location_lat, messages.location_lng, 
participants_info.display_name, messages.deleted 
from messages, participants_info 
where messages.participant_id=participants_info._id 
order by messages.date asc 
Weather.db GO Weather select citynow.myLocation, citynow.cityName, 
citynow.updateTime, 
datetime((citynow.updateTime)/1000,'unixepoch') as 
"Converted Time (UTC)", citynow.city_my_location, 
citynow.state, citynow.country, citynow.timestamp, 
datetime((citynow.timestamp)/1000,'unixepoch') as 
"Converted Timestamp (UTC)", citynow.latitude, 
citynow.longitude 
from citynow 
order by citynow.updateTime asc 
Workout.db Map My 
Walk 
select workouts.name, timeSeries.timestamp, 
datetime((timeSeries.timestamp)/1000,'unixepoch') as 
"Converted Time (UTC)", timeSeries.distance, 
timeSeries.speed, timeSeries.longitude, timeSeries.latitude, 
timeSeries.altitude 
from timeSeries, workouts 
where timeSeries.localID=workouts.localId 
order by timeSeries.timestamp asc 
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